The North Korean threat group Scarcruft (APT37) has expanded its campaign targeting South Korea with a combination of infostealers, backdoors, and ransomware. The campaign, dubbed ChinopuNK, began in July 2025 and includes multiple malware tools designed for espionage and financial gain. The attacks start with phishing emails containing decoy documents about postal code updates. Once opened, these documents download NubSpy, a backdoor that uses the PubNub cloud service for command-and-control (C2) communication. The group also deploys ChillyChino, a PowerShell backdoor rewritten in Rust, and VCD ransomware, which encrypts specific file paths tailored to individual targets.
In September 2025, a new phishing campaign, Operation HanKook Phantom, was discovered. This campaign targets individuals associated with the National Intelligence Research Association, including academic figures, former government officials, and researchers. The campaign uses spear-phishing emails with a lure for a "National Intelligence Research Society Newsletter" containing a ZIP archive attachment with a Windows shortcut (LNK) masquerading as a PDF document. The LNK file drops RokRAT malware, which is capable of collecting system information, executing arbitrary commands, enumerating the file system, capturing screenshots, and downloading additional payloads. RokRAT exfiltrates data via Dropbox, Google Cloud, pCloud, and Yandex Cloud. The campaign also involves a PowerShell script that deploys a dropper, which then runs a next-stage payload to steal sensitive data while concealing network traffic as a Chrome file upload. The lure document used in this instance is a statement issued by Kim Yo Jong, the Deputy Director of the Publicity and Information Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, rejecting Seoul's efforts at reconciliation.
Additionally, a modular backdoor malware for the macOS platform, ChillyHell, has resurfaced with a new version. This malware gives attackers remote access and allows them to drop payloads or brute-force passwords. The new ChillyHell sample was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 2, 2025, and was notarized by Apple in 2021. The malware has multiple persistence mechanisms and can exfiltrate data, drop additional payloads, enumerate user accounts, and perform local password cracking. Apple revoked notarization of the developer certificates associated with the malware once notified by Jamf.
A new malware family, ZynorRAT, has been discovered, targeting Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. ZynorRAT uses a Telegram bot for command and control and supports a wide range of functions, including file exfiltration, system enumeration, and arbitrary command execution.
The North Korea-linked threat actors associated with the Contagious Interview campaign have been attributed to a previously undocumented backdoor called AkdoorTea, along with tools like TsunamiKit and Tropidoor. The campaign targets software developers across all operating systems, Windows, Linux, and macOS, particularly those involved in cryptocurrency and Web3 projects. The campaign involves impersonated recruiters offering lucrative job roles over platforms like LinkedIn, Upwork, Freelancer, and Crypto Jobs List. The attacks deliver several pieces of malware such as BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, GolangGhost, and PylangGhost. WeaselStore's functionality is similar to BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret, focusing on exfiltration of sensitive data from browsers and cryptocurrency wallets. TsunamiKit is a malware toolkit designed for information and cryptocurrency theft, first discovered in November 2024. TsunamiKit comprises several components, including TsunamiLoader, TsunamiInjector, TsunamiInstallor, TsunamiHardener, and TsunamiClient. TsunamiClient incorporates a .NET spyware and drops cryptocurrency miners like XMRig and NBMiner. Tropidoor is a sophisticated payload linked to the DeceptiveDevelopment group, sharing code with PostNapTea and LightlessCan. AkdoorTea is a remote access trojan delivered by a Windows batch script, sharing commonalities with Akdoor and NukeSped (Manuscrypt).
The DeceptiveDevelopment campaign targets developers associated with cryptocurrency and decentralized finance projects with fake job offers aimed at information theft and malware infection. The campaign supplies stolen developer information to North Korea’s fraudulent IT workers, who use it to pose as job seekers and land remote work at unsuspecting companies. The campaign involves tight collaboration with North Korea’s network of fraudulent IT workers, tracked as WageMole. The North Korean IT workers operate in teams, focusing on obtaining work in Western countries, particularly the US, and in Europe, targeting France, Poland, Ukraine, and Albania. The North Korean IT workers impersonate real companies and engineers, producing engineering drawings with falsified approval stamps, and focus on self-education in web programming, blockchain, English, and AI integration.
The Contagious Interview campaign has expanded to include malicious packages in npm, PyPI, and RubyGems ecosystems. The campaign uses Discord webhooks as a command-and-control (C2) channel to exfiltrate data. The malicious packages include mysql-dumpdiscord (npm), nodejs.discord (npm), malinssx, malicus, and maliinn (PyPI), and sqlcommenter_rails (RubyGems.org). The campaign has published 338 malicious packages, downloaded over 50,000 times, using more than 180 fake personas and over a dozen C2 endpoints. The campaign targets Web3, cryptocurrency, and blockchain developers, as well as job seekers in the technical sector. The malware families delivered include HexEval, XORIndex, encrypted loaders, BeaverTail, and InvisibleFerret. The campaign involves typosquatting and lookalike libraries to deceive developers.
North Korean hackers have adopted the 'EtherHiding' technique that leverages smart contracts to host and deliver malware in social engineering campaigns that steal cryptocurrency. The technique of EtherHiding was first described by Guardio Labs in 2023. The EtherHiding technique is resilient to conventional takedown and blocklisting efforts. The identity of an attacker using EtherHiding is difficult to trace due to the pseudonymous nature of blockchain transactions. EtherHiding represents a shift towards next-generation bulletproof hosting where the inherent features of blockchain technology are used for malicious purposes. A DPRK nation state threat actor, tracked internally as UNC5342, has been employing EtherHiding since February in Contagious Interview operations. The smart contract hosts the JADESNOW downloader that interacts with Ethereum to fetch the third-stage payload, which is a JavaScript version of the InvisibleFerret malware. The payload runs in memory and may ask Ethereum for an additional component that steals credentials. The credential stealer component targets passwords, credit cards, and cryptocurrency wallet (MetaMask and Phantom) information stored on web browsers like Chrome and Edge. The malware runs in the background and listens for incoming commands from its command and control (C2), like executing arbitrary commands and exfiltrating files in ZIP form to an external server or Telegram. The Contagious Interview campaign employs a multi-stage malware infection process involving JADESNOW, BEAVERTAIL, and INVISIBLEFERRET. The Contagious Interview campaign targets developers in the cryptocurrency and technology sectors to steal sensitive data, cryptocurrency, and gain persistent access to corporate networks. The Contagious Interview campaign uses elaborate social engineering tactics that mimic legitimate recruitment processes through fake recruiters and fabricated companies. Fake recruiters lure candidates onto platforms like Telegram or Discord, then deliver malware through deceptive coding tests or fake software downloads disguised as technical assessments or interview fixes. The Contagious Interview campaign affects Windows, macOS, and Linux systems.