Amazon has disrupted a years-long Russian state-sponsored campaign targeting Western critical infrastructure, including energy sector organizations and cloud-hosted network infrastructure. The campaign, attributed to the GRU-affiliated APT44 group, initially leveraged vulnerabilities in WatchGuard Firebox and XTM, Atlassian Confluence, and Veeam to gain initial access. However, starting in 2025, APT44 shifted its tactics to target misconfigured network edge devices, reducing their exposure and resource expenditure. The group targeted enterprise routers, VPN concentrators, network management appliances, and cloud-based project management systems to harvest credentials and establish persistent access. Amazon's intervention led to the disruption of the campaign, highlighting the ongoing threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors.
APT44, also known as FROZENBARENTS, Sandworm, Seashell Blizzard, and Voodoo Bear, has been active since at least 2021. The group exploited vulnerabilities in WatchGuard Firebox and XTM (CVE-2022-26318), Atlassian Confluence (CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2023-22518), and Veeam (CVE-2023-27532) to compromise network edge devices. The campaign involved credential replay attacks and targeted energy, technology/cloud services, and telecom service providers across North America, Western and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Amazon's threat intelligence team identified and notified affected customers, disrupting active threat actor operations.
Additionally, APT28, another GRU-affiliated group, has been conducting a sustained credential-harvesting campaign targeting users of UKR[.]net, a webmail and news service popular in Ukraine. The campaign, observed between June 2024 and April 2025, involves deploying UKR[.]net-themed login pages on legitimate services like Mocky to entice recipients into entering their credentials and 2FA codes. Links to these pages are embedded within PDF documents distributed via phishing emails, often shortened using services like tiny[.]cc or tinyurl[.]com. In some cases, APT28 uses subdomains created on platforms like Blogger (*.blogspot[.]com) to launch a two-tier redirection chain leading to the credential harvesting page. The campaign is part of a broader set of phishing and credential theft operations targeting various institutions in pursuit of Russia's strategic objectives.
APT28's recent campaign targeted Turkish renewable energy scientists with a climate change policy document from a real Middle Eastern think tank. The group used phishing emails themed to match their intended targets and written in the targets' native tongues. Victims were redirected to a login page mimicking a legitimate online service after following a link in a phishing email. APT28 used regular hosted services rather than custom tools and infrastructure for their attacks. The targets included an IT integrator based in Uzbekistan, a European think tank, a military organization in North Macedonia, and scientists and researchers associated with a Turkish energy and nuclear research organization. The campaign was highly selective and consistent with GRU collection priorities, aligning with geopolitical, military, or strategic intelligence objectives.
APT28 has been targeting organizations associated with energy research, defense collaboration, and government communication in a new credential-harvesting campaign. The group used phishing pages impersonating Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA), Google, and Sophos VPN portals. Victims were redirected to legitimate domains after entering their credentials. APT28 relied heavily on free hosting and tunneling services such as Webhook.site, InfinityFree, Byet Internet Services, and Ngrok to host phishing content, capture user data, and manage redirections. In February 2025, APT28 deployed a Microsoft OWA phishing page and used the ShortURL link-shortening service for the first-stage redirection. The group employed a webhook relying on HTML to load a PDF lure document in the browser for two seconds before redirecting the victim to a second webhook hosting the spoofed OWA login page. In July, APT28 deployed a spoofed OWA login portal containing Turkish-language text and targeting Turkish scientists and researchers. In June, APT28 deployed a spoofed Sophos VPN password reset page hosted on InfinityFree infrastructure. In September, APT28 hosted two spoofed OWA expired password pages on an InfinityFree domain. In April, Recorded Future discovered a spoofed Google password reset page in Portuguese, hosted on a free apex domain from Byet Internet Services. APT28 abused Ngrok's free service to connect servers behind a firewall to a proxy server and expose that server to the internet without changing firewall rules. APT28's ability to adapt its infrastructure and rebrand credential-harvesting pages suggests it will continue to abuse free hosting, tunneling, and link-shortening services to reduce operational costs and obscure attribution.
Recently, APT28 exploited CVE-2026-21509, a recently patched vulnerability in multiple versions of Microsoft Office. The attacks involved malicious DOC files themed around EU COREPER consultations in Ukraine and impersonated the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center. The malicious document triggers a WebDAV-based download chain that installs malware via COM hijacking, a malicious DLL (EhStoreShell.dll), shellcode hidden in an image file (SplashScreen.png), and a scheduled task (OneDriveHealth). The scheduled task execution leads to the termination and restart of the explorer.exe process, ensuring the loading of the EhStoreShell.dll file. This DLL executes shellcode from the image file, which launches the COVENANT software (framework) on the computer. COVENANT uses the Filen (filen.io) cloud storage service for command-and-control (C2) operations. APT28 used three more documents in attacks against various EU-based organizations, indicating that the campaign extends beyond Ukraine.
APT28 has also been linked to the exploitation of CVE-2026-21513, a high-severity security feature bypass in the MSHTML Framework, as a zero-day before it was patched in February 2026. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass security features by manipulating browser and Windows Shell handling, leading to potential code execution. The group used a malicious Windows Shortcut (LNK) file that embeds an HTML file to exploit CVE-2026-21513, initiating communication with the domain wellnesscaremed[.]com. The exploit leverages nested iframes and multiple DOM contexts to manipulate trust boundaries, bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) and Internet Explorer Enhanced Security Configuration (IE ESC). The technique allows execution of malicious code outside the browser sandbox via ShellExecuteExW. The vulnerable code path can be triggered through any component embedding MSHTML, suggesting additional delivery mechanisms beyond LNK-based phishing should be expected.
APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, Strontium, and Sednit, has been using a custom variant of the open-source Covenant post-exploitation framework for long-term espionage operations. Since April 2024, APT28 has used two implants named BeardShell and Covenant in their attacks. BeardShell leverages the legitimate cloud storage service Icedrive for command-and-control (C2) communication and can execute PowerShell commands in a .NET runtime environment. BeardShell uses a unique obfuscation technique previously seen in Xtunnel, a network-pivoting tool that APT28 used in the 2010s. APT28 has modified the Covenant framework with deterministic implant identifiers tied to host characteristics, modified execution flow to evade behavioral detection, and new cloud-based communication protocols. Since July 2025, APT28 has used the Filen cloud provider with Covenant, previously using Koofr and pCloud services. Covenant is used as the primary implant, and BeardShell serves as the fallback tool. ESET believes that APT28's advanced malware development team returned to activity in 2024, giving the threat group new long-term espionage capabilities. The technical similarities with 2010-era malware indicate continuity in the threat group's development team.