Notepad++ Update Mechanism Exploited to Deliver Malicious Payloads
Updated: 17.02.2026 20:29
· First: 11.12.2025 23:04
· 📰 5 src / 6 articles
Notepad++ version 8.8.9 was released to address a security flaw in its WinGUp update tool that allowed attackers to push malicious executables instead of legitimate updates. Users reported incidents where the updater spawned a malicious AutoUpdater.exe that collected device information and exfiltrated it to a remote site. The flaw was mitigated by enforcing updates only from GitHub and later by requiring signature verification for all updates. Security researchers noted targeted attacks against organizations with interests in East Asia, where Notepad++ processes were used to gain initial access. The attack involved an infrastructure-level compromise at the hosting provider level, allowing malicious actors to intercept and redirect update traffic. The incident commenced in June 2025 and continued until December 2025, with the Notepad++ website later migrated to a new hosting provider. The attackers were likely Chinese state-sponsored threat actors, selectively redirecting update requests from certain users to malicious servers. The hosting provider for the update feature was compromised, enabling targeted traffic redirections. The attackers regained access using previously obtained internal service credentials. Notepad++ has since migrated all clients to a new hosting provider with stronger security and plans to enforce mandatory certificate signature verification in version 8.9.2. The compromise involved shared hosting infrastructure rather than a flaw in the software's code, with attackers gaining access at the hosting provider level to intercept and manipulate traffic bound for the Notepad++ update endpoint. Direct server access by the attackers ended on September 2, 2025, but credentials associated with internal services remained exposed until December 2, 2025, allowing continued traffic redirection. The hosting provider confirmed no additional customers were affected. Notepad++ version 8.9.2 introduced a 'double-lock' design for its update mechanism, including verifying the signed installer from GitHub and checking the signed XML from the notepad-plus-plus.org domain. The auto-updater now removes libcurl.dll to eliminate DLL side-loading risk, removes unsecured cURL SSL options, and restricts plugin management execution to programs signed with the same certificate as WinGUp. Users can exclude the auto-updater during UI installation or deploy the MSI package with the NOUPDATER=1 flag. The threat group Lotus Blossom, linked to China, was involved in the compromise, using a custom backdoor called 'Chrysalis' as part of the attack chain.