The GlassWorm malware campaign has resurfaced with a significant escalation, adding at least 72 new malicious Open VSX extensions since January 31, 2026. The malware uses invisible Unicode characters to hide malicious code and targets GitHub, NPM, and OpenVSX account credentials, as well as cryptocurrency wallet data. The campaign initially impacted 49 extensions, with an estimated 35,800 downloads, though this figure includes inflated numbers due to bots and visibility-boosting tactics. The Eclipse Foundation has revoked leaked tokens and introduced security measures, but the threat actors have pivoted to GitHub and now returned to OpenVSX with updated command-and-control endpoints. The malware's global reach includes systems in the United States, South America, Europe, Asia, and a government entity in the Middle East. Koi Security has accessed the attackers' server and shared victim data with law enforcement. The threat actors have posted a fresh transaction to the Solana blockchain, providing an updated C2 endpoint for downloading the next-stage payload. The attacker's server was inadvertently exposed, revealing a partial list of victims spanning the U.S., South America, Europe, and Asia, including a major government entity from the Middle East. The threat actor is assessed to be Russian-speaking and uses the open-source browser extension C2 framework named RedExt as part of their infrastructure. The third wave of GlassWorm uses Rust-based implants packaged inside the extensions and targets popular tools and developer frameworks like Flutter, Vim, Yaml, Tailwind, Svelte, React Native, and Vue. Additionally, a malicious Rust package named "evm-units" was discovered, targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux systems. This package, uploaded to crates.io in mid-April 2025, attracted over 7,000 downloads and was designed to stealthily execute on developer machines by masquerading as an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) unit helper tool. The package checks for the presence of Qihoo 360 antivirus and alters its execution flow accordingly. The references to EVM and Uniswap indicate that the supply chain incident is designed to target developers in the Web3 space. The latest development involves the compromise of a legitimate developer's resources to push malicious updates to downstream users, with the malicious extensions having previously been presented as legitimate developer utilities and collectively accumulated over 22,000 Open VSX downloads prior to the malicious releases. A new GlassWorm malware attack through compromised OpenVSX extensions focuses on stealing passwords, crypto-wallet data, and developer credentials and configurations from macOS systems. The threat actor gained access to the account of a legitimate developer (oorzc) and pushed malicious updates with the GlassWorm payload to four extensions that had been downloaded 22,000 times. GlassWorm attacks first appeared in late October, hiding the malicious code using "invisible" Unicode characters to steal cryptocurrency wallet and developer account details. The malware also supports VNC-based remote access and SOCKS proxying. Over time and across multiple attack waves, GlassWorm impacted both Microsoft's official Visual Studio Code marketplace and its open-source alternative for unsupported IDEs, OpenVSX. In a previous campaign, GlassWorm showed signs of evolution, targeting macOS systems, and its developers were working to add a replacement mechanism for the Trezor and Ledger apps. A new report from Socket's security team describes a new campaign that relied on trojanizing the following extensions: oorzc.ssh-tools v0.5.1, oorzc.i18n-tools-plus v1.6.8, oorzc.mind-map v1.0.61, oorzc.scss-to-css-compile v1.3.4. The malicious updates were pushed on January 30, and Socket reports that the extensions had been innocuous for two years. This suggests that the oorzc account was most likely compromised by GlassWorm operators. According to the researchers, the campaign targets macOS systems exclusively, pulling instructions from Solana transaction memos. Notably, Russian-locale systems are excluded, which may hint at the origin of the attacker. GlassWorm loads a macOS information stealer that establishes persistence on infected systems via a LaunchAgent, enabling execution at login. It harvests browser data across Firefox and Chromium, wallet extensions and wallet apps, macOS keychain data, Apple Notes databases, Safari cookies, developer secrets, and documents from the local filesystem, and exfiltrates everything to the attacker's infrastructure at 45.32.150[.]251. Socket reported the packages to the Eclipse Foundation, the operator of the Open VSX platform, and the security team confirmed unauthorized publishing access, revoked tokens, and removed the malicious releases. The only exception is oorzc.ssh-tools, which was removed completely from Open VSX due to discovering multiple malicious releases. Currently, versions of the affected extensions on the market are clean, but developers who downloaded the malicious releases should perform a full system clean-up and rotate all their secrets and passwords. The GlassWorm campaign now abuses extensionPack and extensionDependencies to turn initially standalone-looking extensions into transitive delivery vehicles in later updates. The new extensions mimic widely used developer utilities and feature heavier obfuscation and Solana wallet rotation to evade detection. The campaign also affects 151 GitHub repositories and two npm packages using the same Unicode technique. Additionally, 88 new malicious npm packages were uploaded in three waves between November 2025 and February 2026, using Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD) to modify malicious code on the fly. The GlassWorm malware campaign is being used to fuel an ongoing attack that leverages the stolen GitHub tokens to inject malware into hundreds of Python repositories. The attack targets Python projects including Django apps, ML research code, Streamlit dashboards, and PyPI packages by appending obfuscated code to files like setup.py, main.py, and app.py. The earliest injections date back to March 8, 2026. The attackers, upon gaining access to the developer accounts, rebase the latest legitimate commits on the default branch of the targeted repositories with malicious code, and then force-push the changes, while keeping the original commit's message, author, and author date intact. This new offshoot of the GlassWorm campaign has been codenamed ForceMemo. The Base64-encoded payload, appended to the end of the Python file, features GlassWorm-like checks to determine if the system has its locale set to Russian. If so, it skips execution. In all other cases, the malware queries the transaction memo field associated with a Solana wallet ("BjVeAjPrSKFiingBn4vZvghsGj9KCE8AJVtbc9S8o8SC") previously linked to GlassWorm to extract the payload URL. The earliest transaction on the C2 address dates to November 27, 2025 -- over three months before the first GitHub repo injections on March 8, 2026. The address has 50 transactions total, with the attacker regularly updating the payload URL, sometimes multiple times per day. The disclosure comes as Socket flagged a new iteration of the GlassWorm that technically retains the same core tradecraft while improving survivability and evasion by leveraging extensionPack and extensionDependencies to deliver the malicious payload by means of a transitive distribution model. Aikido Security also attributed the GlassWorm author to a mass campaign that compromised more than 151 GitHub repositories with malicious code concealed using invisible Unicode characters. The decoded payload is configured to fetch the C2 instructions from the same Solana wallet, indicating that the threat actor has been targeting GitHub repositories in multiple waves. The use of different delivery methods and code obfuscation methods, but the same Solana infrastructure, suggests ForceMemo is a new delivery vector maintained and operated by the GlassWorm threat actor, who has now expanded from compromising VS Code extensions to a broader GitHub account takeover. The attacker injects malware by force-pushing to the default branch of compromised repositories. This technique rewrites git history, preserves the original commit message and author, and leaves no pull request or commit trail in GitHub's UI. No other documented supply chain campaign uses this injection method.