UNC5518 Access-as-a-Service Campaign via ClickFix and Fake CAPTCHA Pages
Updated: 24.05.2026 17:12
· First: 21.08.2025 19:25
· 📰 28 src / 36 articles
A **large-scale ClickFix campaign** is now exploiting **CVE-2026-26980**, a critical SQL injection vulnerability in Ghost CMS (versions 3.24.0–6.19.0), to compromise over **700 domains**—including universities (Harvard, Oxford), DuckDuckGo, and fintech/media sites. Threat actors **steal admin API keys** via the flaw, then inject malicious JavaScript into articles that fingerprints visitors and serves a **fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA lure** via iframe overlays. Victims tricked into pasting commands into the Windows command prompt receive payloads such as **DLL loaders, JavaScript droppers, and an Electron-based malware sample (UtilifySetup.exe)**. The campaign highlights **competing threat clusters** re-infecting patched sites and leverages **unpatched, trusted platforms** to scale ClickFix’s social engineering impact. This evolution builds on prior ClickFix tactics, including **DNS-based staging via `nslookup`** (retrieving ModeloRAT payloads from attacker-controlled DNS servers), **CrashFix Chrome extensions** (delivering ModeloRAT via fake browser crashes), and **SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs abuse** (fetching Amatera Stealer via Google Calendar dead drops). The campaign’s adaptability—combining **exploit-driven compromise**, **cloaking scripts**, and **multi-payload delivery**—underscores its resilience despite 2025–2026 disruptions, with actors refining tradecraft to maximize evasion via **trusted service abuse**, **steganography**, and **cross-platform targeting** (Windows/macOS/Linux).