The **ScarCruft (APT37) Ruby Jumper campaign**, first discovered in **December 2025** and detailed in **February 2026**, marks a **significant expansion of tactics** to breach air-gapped networks and abuse legitimate cloud services for command-and-control (C2). The campaign deploys a **multi-stage infection chain** beginning with a malicious LNK file that drops a decoy document (e.g., an Arabic translation of a North Korean article on the Palestine-Israel conflict), an executable payload (**RESTLEAF**), a PowerShell script, and a batch file. RESTLEAF leverages **Zoho WorkDrive for C2**—the first known instance of ScarCruft using this service—to fetch shellcode, which then deploys **SNAKEDROPPER**. This implant installs a Ruby runtime, establishes persistence via a **scheduled task (`rubyupdatecheck`)** that replaces the RubyGems default file `operating_system.rb`, and drops **THUMBSBD** and **VIRUSTASK**, both designed to **weaponize removable media (USB drives)** for lateral movement into air-gapped systems.
THUMBSBD supports **keylogging, audio/video surveillance, and file exfiltration**, while also creating **hidden directories on USB drives** to stage operator commands or store execution output. VIRUSTASK focuses on **initial access propagation** via USB drives, replacing legitimate files with malicious shortcuts that execute the Ruby interpreter when opened. The campaign also delivers **FOOTWINE**, a reconnaissance tool disguised as an APK file that harvests documents and monitors removable drive activity, and **BLUELIGHT**, a backdoor that adapts its C2 mode based on network connectivity (direct cloud communication or USB-based staging).
This follows earlier ScarCruft operations, including **ransomware attacks (July 2025)**, **Operation HanKook Phantom (September 2025)**, and the **Contagious Interview campaign (February 2026)**, which targeted developers via malicious repositories and job-themed lures. The Ruby Jumper campaign underscores ScarCruft’s **expanded focus on air-gapped infiltration**, combining **cloud abuse with physical media exploitation** to evade network isolation and achieve persistent surveillance with minimal forensic traces. Zscaler ThreatLabz confirmed the use of **six distinct tools** in this campaign, five of which were previously undocumented.