Vulnerability
Unpatched Gogs Rebase Injection Remote Code Execution Risk
Updated 28.05.2026 17:25
Case score 59
Score breakdown
- Total
- 59
- Lead score
- 59
- Support bonus
- +0 / 20
- Scoring support
- 0
- Context members
- 0
Top contributors
- Vulnerability Defines the unpatched Gogs rebase argument injection issue, affected versions, attack path, and current exposure concerns. base
Case score 59
Members 1
Latest activity 28.05.2026 17:25
Members 1
First seen 28.05.2026 17:25
Last seen 28.05.2026 17:25
Updated 28.05.2026 17:25
Overview
An unpatched **Gogs** argument injection flaw in the **Rebase before merging** workflow can give an authenticated, non-admin user remote code execution on self-hosted servers. The issue affects **Gogs 0.14.2** and **0.15.0+dev**, and default deployments with open registration and unrestricted repository creation lower the barrier to reaching the vulnerable path.
Public technical details describe server compromise risk, exposure of private repositories and secrets, and potential code tampering. The maintainers had acknowledged the report, but no patch or remediation timeline was available at disclosure time, while more than **2,400** Internet-facing Gogs servers were noted as exposed overall.
Attackers can gain remote code execution on **Gogs** servers through an unpatched argument injection flaw in the **Rebase before merging** path. The issue affects **Gogs 0.14.2** and **0.15.0+dev**, and a malicious branch name can inject the `--exec` flag into `git rebase` during merge processing. The flaw requires an authenticated account but not admin rights, and default deployments with open registration and unlimited repository creation reduce that barrier because a user can create an account and repository before triggering the vulnerable flow. Successful exploitation can run code as the Gogs server process user and expose private repositories, password hashes, API tokens, SSH keys, and 2FA secrets while also enabling code tampering and movement to other reachable systems.
The weakness was reported to the maintainers on March 17, acknowledged on March 28, and remained unpatched when public technical details were released on May 28. Available material also notes more than **2,400** Internet-facing Gogs servers, with concentrations in **Asia** and **Europe**, which increases the number of systems administrators need to review for exposure. Available evidence does not confirm in-the-wild exploitation of this specific zero-day, and no vendor patch or final remediation timeline was available at disclosure time.