Campaign
Gamaredon fileless WinRAR intrusion chain in Ukrainian state and infrastructure networks
Updated 01.06.2026 14:00
Case score 56
Score breakdown
- Total
- 56
- Lead score
- 56
- Support bonus
- +0 / 20
- Scoring support
- 0
- Context members
- 0
Top contributors
- Campaign Anchors the dossier with the active target set, intrusion chain, stealth tradecraft, and mitigation guidance. base
Case score 56
Members 1
Latest activity 01.06.2026 14:00
Members 1
First seen 01.06.2026 14:00
Last seen 01.06.2026 14:00
Updated 01.06.2026 14:00
Overview
**Gamaredon** remained active in January 2026 against **Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure** networks, using a booby-trapped xHTML file and malicious RAR archive to exploit **CVE-2025-8088** in **WinRAR**. The intrusion chain places a hidden HTA file in Startup, leans on **fileless VBScript**, stores components in **NTFS Alternate Data Streams**, and uses dead-drop resolvers on **Telegram** and **Cloudflare** to support long-term access and document theft.
Defensive focus has shifted to patching **WinRAR** to **7.13 or later** and hunting for startup-folder HTA files, alternate data streams, suspicious VBScript, scheduled tasks, registry changes, and removable-media spread. The activity is ongoing, but available evidence does not quantify how many organizations were compromised or how much data was taken.
Attackers tied to **Gamaredon** are actively targeting **Ukrainian government, military, and critical-infrastructure** networks for espionage, long-term access, and document theft. The observed January 2026 intrusion chain starts with a booby-trapped xHTML file that delivers a malicious RAR archive and abuses **CVE-2025-8088** in **WinRAR** to place a hidden HTA file in the Windows Startup folder. The operation has shifted heavily toward **fileless VBScript** execution and storage in **NTFS Alternate Data Streams**, reducing visible disk artifacts and complicating host-level detection. Persistence and spread rely on scheduled tasks, registry changes, USB media, and network drives, while command-and-control details are pulled through dead-drop resolvers on **Telegram** and **Cloudflare**.
Available material describes the malware as a worm and backdoor referred to as **GammaWorm**, used to preserve access inside Ukrainian networks and to move quietly across connected environments. Defensive guidance is to update **WinRAR** to version **7.13 or later**, watch for startup-folder HTA files, alternate data streams, suspicious VBScript activity, malicious shortcuts, and unusual lookups tied to the dead-drop infrastructure. The activity is confirmed as ongoing, but available evidence does not quantify the number of compromised organizations or documents taken, and cleanup may require wiping infected systems when fallback mechanisms cannot be removed reliably.