CISA and Partners Release OT Asset Inventory Guidance

Chinese state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors, specifically the group known as Salt Typhoon, have been conducting a sustained campaign to gain long-term access to critical infrastructure networks worldwide. This campaign targets telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military networks, exploiting vulnerabilities in routers and taking steps to evade detection and maintain persistent access. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in coordination with the National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and international partners, released a joint advisory detailing this ongoing malicious activity. The advisory provides actionable guidance and intelligence to help organizations defend against these sophisticated cyber threats. The advisory builds on previous reporting and incorporates updated threat intelligence from investigations conducted through August 2025, reflecting overlapping indicators with industry reporting on various Chinese state-sponsored threat groups. Salt Typhoon has been active since at least 2019, targeting at least 600 organizations, including 200 in the U.S., and 80 countries. The Czech Republic's National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) issued a warning about data transfers to China, highlighting concerns over the transfer of system and user data to the PRC and the remote administration of technical assets. The Czech government previously accused China of targeting its critical infrastructure through APT 31, which began in 2022. China's offensive cyber activities include large-scale telco attacks by Salt Typhoon and positioning for potential destructive cyberattacks. The advisory tracks this cluster of activity to multiple advanced persistent threats (APTs), though it partially overlaps with Salt Typhoon. The advisory details how state-backed threat actors, including Salt Typhoon, penetrate networks around the world, as well as how defenders can protect their own environments. The Czech Republic's National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) has assessed the risk of significant disruptions caused by China at a 'High' level, indicating a high probability of occurrence. NUKIB confirmed malicious activities of Chinese cyber-actors targeting the Czech Republic, including a recent APT31 campaign targeting the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese government has access to data stored by private cloud service providers within the Czech Republic, ensuring that sensitive data is always within its reach. NUKIB warns about consumer devices, such as smartphones, IP cameras, electric cars, large language models, and even medical devices and photovoltaic converters manufactured by Chinese firms, as risky devices that can transfer potentially sensitive data to Chinese infrastructure. 45 previously unreported domains associated with Salt Typhoon and UNC4841 have been discovered, with the oldest domain registration activity dating back to May 2020.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a draft of the Minimum Elements for a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for public comment. This update reflects advancements in SBOM practices, tooling, and stakeholder adoption since the 2021 guidelines. The draft includes new elements and updates existing ones to align with current capabilities. The public can submit comments until October 3, 2025. The SBOM is a tool that provides transparency into the software supply chain by documenting software components. This transparency helps organizations make risk-informed decisions and improve software security. The updated guidelines aim to empower federal agencies and other organizations to enhance their cybersecurity posture. However, experts have expressed concerns about the practicality and operationalization of SBOMs, calling for more sector-specific guidance and support for automation and vulnerability integration.

The Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group Static Tundra is exploiting a seven-year-old vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software to establish persistent access to target networks. The group, linked to the FSB's Center 16 unit, targets telecommunications, higher education, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure sectors across North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, including increased attacks in Ukraine since the start of the war. The attacks involve exploiting the Smart Install feature to execute arbitrary code and collect configuration files from thousands of networking devices. The group uses custom tools like SYNful Knock for persistence and employs SNMP to gain unauthorized access. The primary goal is long-term intelligence gathering, with a focus on strategic interests of the Russian government. The FBI and Cisco have issued advisories warning about the ongoing exploitation of this vulnerability, urging organizations to patch or disable the Smart Install feature. End-of-life devices are particularly vulnerable, as they no longer receive security updates, creating persistent attack vectors. The FBI has detected the actors collecting configuration files for thousands of networking devices associated with US entities across critical infrastructure sectors. The actors used the unauthorized access to conduct reconnaissance in the victim networks, which revealed their interest in protocols and applications commonly associated with industrial control systems. The same hacking group has previously targeted the networks of US state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government organizations and aviation entities over the last decade. The U.S. Department of State has offered a $10 million reward for information on three FSB officers involved in these cyberattacks, highlighting the group's extensive targeting of critical infrastructure and energy companies globally. The three officers, Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov, and Marat Valeryevich Tyukov, targeted over 380 energy-sector companies in 135 countries. They were involved in the Dragonfly campaign, which included obtaining persistent access to victim networks and infecting them with the Havex malware through supply chain compromise.