CyberHappenings logo

Track cybersecurity events as they unfold. Sourced timelines, daily updates. Fast, privacy‑respecting. No ads, no tracking.

PromptFix Exploit Targets AI Browsers for Malicious Prompts

First reported
Last updated
📰 3 unique sources, 3 articles

Summary

Hide ▲

Researchers from Guardio Labs have demonstrated a new prompt injection technique called PromptFix. This exploit tricks generative AI (GenAI) models into executing malicious instructions embedded within fake CAPTCHA checks on web pages. The attack targets AI-driven browsers like Perplexity's Comet, which automate tasks such as shopping and email management. The exploit misleads AI models into interacting with phishing pages or fraudulent sites without user intervention, leading to potential data breaches and financial losses. The technique, dubbed Scamlexity, represents a new era of scams where AI convenience collides with invisible scam surfaces, making humans collateral damage. The exploit can trick AI models into purchasing items on fake websites, entering credentials on phishing pages, or downloading malicious payloads. The findings underscore the need for robust defenses in AI systems to anticipate, detect, and neutralize such attacks. Microsoft Edge is embedding agentic browsing features through a Copilot integration, and OpenAI is developing an agentic AI browser platform codenamed 'Aura'. Comet is quickly penetrating the mainstream consumer market. Agentic AI browsers were released with inadequate security safeguards against known and novel attacks. Guardio advises against assigning sensitive tasks to agentic AI browsers until their security matures. AI browser agents from major AI firms failed to reliably detect the signs of a phishing site. Comet often added items to a shopping cart, filled out credit-card details, and clicked the buy button on a fake Walmart site. AI browsers with access to email will read and act on prompts embedded in the messages. AI companies need stronger sanitation and guardrails against these attacks. Nearly all companies (96%) claim to want to expand their use of AI agents in the next year, but most are not prepared for the new risks posed by AI agents in a business environment. A fundamental issue is how to discern actions taken through a browser by a user versus those taken by an agent. AI agents need to be experts at not just getting things done, but at sussing out and blocking potential security threats to workers and company data. Companies should move from "trust, but verify" to "doubt, and double verify"—essentially hobbling automation until an AI agent has shown it can always complete a workflow properly. Defective AI operations continue to be a major problem, and security represents another layer on top of those issues. Companies should hold off on putting AI agents into any business process that requires reliability until AI-agent makers offer better visibility, control, and security. Companies that intend to push their use of AI into agent-based workflows should focus on a comprehensive strategy, including inventorying all AI services used by employees and creating an AI usage policy. Employees need to understand the basics of AI safety and what it means to give these bots information or privileges to do things on their behalf.

Timeline

  1. 20.08.2025 16:01 📰 3 articles · ⏱ 27d ago

    PromptFix Exploit Demonstrated in AI-Driven Browsers

    AI browser agents from major AI firms failed to reliably detect the signs of a phishing site. Comet often added items to a shopping cart, filled out credit-card details, and clicked the buy button on a fake Walmart site. AI browsers with access to email will read and act on prompts embedded in the messages. AI companies need stronger sanitation and guardrails against these attacks. Nearly all companies (96%) claim to want to expand their use of AI agents in the next year, but most are not prepared for the new risks posed by AI agents in a business environment. A fundamental issue is how to discern actions taken through a browser by a user versus those taken by an agent. AI agents need to be experts at not just getting things done, but at sussing out and blocking potential security threats to workers and company data. Companies should move from "trust, but verify" to "doubt, and double verify"—essentially hobbling automation until an AI agent has shown it can always complete a workflow properly. Defective AI operations continue to be a major problem, and security represents another layer on top of those issues. Companies should hold off on putting AI agents into any business process that requires reliability until AI-agent makers offer better visibility, control, and security. Companies that intend to push their use of AI into agent-based workflows should focus on a comprehensive strategy, including inventorying all AI services used by employees and creating an AI usage policy. Employees need to understand the basics of AI safety and what it means to give these bots information or privileges to do things on their behalf.

    Show sources

Information Snippets

Similar Happenings

MostereRAT Malware Campaign Targets Japanese Windows Users

A new malware campaign involving MostereRAT, a banking malware-turned-remote access Trojan (RAT), has been identified. This campaign uses sophisticated evasion techniques, including the use of an obscure programming language, disabling of security tools, and mutual TLS (mTLS) for command-and-control communications to maintain long-term access to compromised systems. The malware targets Microsoft Windows users in Japan, deploying through phishing emails and weaponized Word documents. MostereRAT's capabilities include persistence, privilege escalation, AV evasion, and remote access tool deployment. The campaign highlights the importance of removing local administrator privileges and blocking unapproved remote access tools. The malware's design reflects long-term, strategic, and flexible objectives, with capabilities to extend functionality, deploy additional payloads, and apply evasion techniques. These features point to an intent to maintain persistent control over compromised systems, maximize the utility of victim resources, and retain ongoing access to valuable data.

Malicious link spreading via Grok AI on X

Threat actors are exploiting X's Grok AI to bypass link posting restrictions and spread malicious links. They hide links in the 'From:' metadata field of video ads, which Grok then reveals when queried, boosting the links' credibility and reach. This technique, dubbed 'Grokking,' leads users to various scams and malware. The abuse leverages Grok's trusted status on X, amplifying the reach of malicious ads to millions of users. Potential solutions include scanning all fields, blocking hidden links, and enhancing Grok's context sanitization to filter and check links against blocklists. The technique involves using adult content as bait to attract users. The links direct users to sketchy ad networks, pushing fake CAPTCHA scams, information-stealing malware, and other suspicious content. The domains are part of the same Traffic Distribution System (TDS). Hundreds of accounts have been engaging in this behavior over the past few days, posting non-stop until they get suspended. Grok's internal security mechanisms are less robust compared to its competitors, making it vulnerable to prompt injection attempts. X's Grok 4 model lacks fine-tuning for security and safety, prioritizing performance over security.

Malicious nx Packages Exfiltrate 2,349 GitHub, Cloud, and AI Credentials

A supply chain attack on the nx build system allowed attackers to publish malicious versions of the popular npm package and auxiliary plugins. These versions contained data-gathering capabilities that exfiltrated 2,349 credentials from GitHub, cloud, and AI services. The attack occurred on August 26, 2025, affecting multiple versions of the nx package and related plugins. The compromised packages were removed from the npm registry, and users were advised to rotate credentials and check for malicious modifications in their systems. The malicious packages scanned file systems, collected credentials, and posted them to GitHub repositories under the users' accounts. The attack exploited a vulnerable workflow introduced on August 21, 2025, which allowed for arbitrary command execution and elevated permissions. The attack took approximately four hours from start to finish, resulting in the exfiltration of around 20,000 sensitive files. The attackers used AI-powered CLI tools to dynamically scan for high-value secrets and modified shell startup files to crash the system upon terminal session opening. A second attack wave was identified on August 28, 2025, affecting over 190 users/organizations and over 3000 repositories. The second wave involved making private repositories public and creating forks to preserve data. The attack unfolded in three distinct phases affecting 2,180 accounts and 7,200 repositories. The first phase impacted 1,700 users and leaked over 2,000 unique secrets. The second phase compromised 480 accounts and exposed 6,700 private repositories. The third phase targeted a single organization, publishing an additional 500 private repositories.

AI-Powered Cyberattacks Targeting Critical Sectors Disrupted

Anthropic disrupted a sophisticated AI-powered cyberattack campaign in July 2025. The operation, codenamed GTG-2002, targeted 17 organizations across healthcare, emergency services, government, and religious institutions. The attacker used Anthropic's AI-powered chatbot Claude to automate theft and extortion, threatening to expose stolen data publicly to extort ransoms ranging from $75,000 to $500,000 in Bitcoin. The attacker employed Claude Code on Kali Linux to automate various phases of the attack cycle, including reconnaissance, credential harvesting, and network penetration. The AI tool was also used to craft bespoke versions of the Chisel tunneling utility, disguise malicious executables, and organize stolen data for monetization. The attacker used Claude Code to create scanning frameworks using a variety of APIs, provide preferred operational TTPs, and perform real-time assistance with network penetrations. The AI tool was also used to create obfuscated versions of the Chisel tunneling tool, develop new TCP proxy code, analyze exfiltrated financial data to determine ransom amounts, and generate visually alarming HTML ransom notes. The attacker used AI to make tactical and strategic decisions, adapt to defensive measures in real-time, and create customized ransom notes and extortion strategies. The attacker's activities led Anthropic to develop a tailored classifier and new detection method to prevent future abuse. The operation represents a shift to 'vibe hacking,' where threat actors use LLMs and agentic AI to perform attacks.

AI-Powered Ransomware 'PromptLock' Under Development

A new AI-powered ransomware strain named 'PromptLock' has been discovered by ESET researchers. This ransomware uses an AI model to generate scripts on the fly, making it difficult to detect. The malware is currently in development and has not been observed in active attacks. It is designed to exfiltrate files, encrypt data, and potentially destroy files. The ransomware was uploaded to VirusTotal from the United States and is written in the Go programming language, with variants for Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. The Bitcoin address associated with PromptLock appears to belong to Satoshi Nakamoto. PromptLock uses the SPECK 128-bit encryption algorithm to lock files and can generate custom notes based on the files affected and the type of infected machine.