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RapperBot Botnet Administrator Charged in the U.S.

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2 unique sources, 2 articles

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The RapperBot botnet, operated by Ethan Foltz, has been responsible for over 370,000 DDoS attacks targeting victims in over 80 countries since 2021. The botnet, also known as Eleven Eleven Botnet and CowBot, primarily infects DVRs and Wi-Fi routers to launch DDoS attacks and mine Monero. Foltz, 22, from Eugene, Oregon, was charged with aiding and abetting computer intrusions related to the botnet. The botnet's command-and-control infrastructure was seized during a search of Foltz's residence on August 6, 2025. The botnet has targeted U.S. government systems, major media platforms, gaming companies, and large tech firms. It added a cryptomining module in 2023 to diversify its revenue stream. The attacks ranged from several terabits to over 1 billion packets per second (pps), with the largest attack exceeding 6 Tbps. The disruption of RapperBot is part of Operation PowerOFF, an international effort to dismantle DDoS-for-hire infrastructures. The botnet has not shown any signs of resurgence in malicious activity following the seizure of its infrastructure.

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  1. 20.08.2025 07:19 2 articles · 1mo ago

    RapperBot botnet administrator charged in the U.S.

    The botnet targeted U.S. government systems, major media platforms, gaming companies, and large tech firms. The botnet added a cryptomining module in 2023 to diversify its revenue stream. The attacks ranged from several terabits to over 1 billion packets per second (pps), with the largest attack exceeding 6 Tbps. The botnet has not shown any signs of resurgence in malicious activity following the seizure of its infrastructure on August 6, 2025.

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