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Russian State-Sponsored Hackers Exploit Cisco Vulnerability for Cyber Espionage

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πŸ“° 4 unique sources, 5 articles

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The Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group Static Tundra is exploiting a seven-year-old vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software to establish persistent access to target networks. The group, linked to the FSB's Center 16 unit, targets telecommunications, higher education, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure sectors across North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, including increased attacks in Ukraine since the start of the war. The attacks involve exploiting the Smart Install feature to execute arbitrary code and collect configuration files from thousands of networking devices. The group uses custom tools like SYNful Knock for persistence and employs SNMP to gain unauthorized access. The primary goal is long-term intelligence gathering, with a focus on strategic interests of the Russian government. The FBI and Cisco have issued advisories warning about the ongoing exploitation of this vulnerability, urging organizations to patch or disable the Smart Install feature. End-of-life devices are particularly vulnerable, as they no longer receive security updates, creating persistent attack vectors. The FBI has detected the actors collecting configuration files for thousands of networking devices associated with US entities across critical infrastructure sectors. The actors used the unauthorized access to conduct reconnaissance in the victim networks, which revealed their interest in protocols and applications commonly associated with industrial control systems. The same hacking group has previously targeted the networks of US state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government organizations and aviation entities over the last decade. The U.S. Department of State has offered a $10 million reward for information on three FSB officers involved in these cyberattacks, highlighting the group's extensive targeting of critical infrastructure and energy companies globally. The three officers, Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov, and Marat Valeryevich Tyukov, targeted over 380 energy-sector companies in 135 countries. They were involved in the Dragonfly campaign, which included obtaining persistent access to victim networks and infecting them with the Havex malware through supply chain compromise.

Timeline

  1. 03.09.2025 22:01 πŸ“° 2 articles

    US Offers $10 Million Reward for Information on FSB Officers

    The U.S. Department of State has increased the reward for information on three Russian FSB officers involved in cyberattacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. These officers, part of the FSB's Center 16, have been actively exploiting the CVE-2018-0171 vulnerability in Cisco devices to breach networks across multiple sectors and countries. The officers have a history of targeting U.S. government agencies and energy companies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation. They have also targeted over 500 foreign energy companies in 135 countries. The group's activities highlight the persistent threat posed by state-sponsored cyber espionage to critical infrastructure and strategic interests. The three officers, Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov, and Marat Valeryevich Tyukov, targeted over 380 energy-sector companies in 135 countries. They were involved in the Dragonfly campaign, which included obtaining persistent access to victim networks and infecting them with the Havex malware through supply chain compromise. In the second phase of the campaign, referred to as Dragonfly 2.0, the three allegedly targeted over 3,300 users at more than 500 US and international companies and entities, including US government agencies, in spear-phishing attacks.

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  2. 20.08.2025 18:59 πŸ“° 4 articles

    Static Tundra Exploits Cisco Vulnerability for Cyber Espionage

    The Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group Static Tundra has been actively exploiting a seven-year-old vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in Cisco IOS and Cisco IOS XE software to establish persistent access to target networks. The group, linked to the FSB's Center 16 unit, targets telecommunications, higher education, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure sectors across North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, including increased attacks in Ukraine since the start of the war. The attacks involve exploiting the Smart Install feature to execute arbitrary code and collect configuration files from thousands of networking devices. The group uses custom tools like SYNful Knock for persistence and employs SNMP to gain unauthorized access. The primary goal is long-term intelligence gathering, with a focus on strategic interests of the Russian government. The FBI and Cisco have issued advisories warning about the ongoing exploitation of this vulnerability, urging organizations to patch or disable the Smart Install feature. End-of-life devices are particularly vulnerable, as they no longer receive security updates, creating persistent attack vectors. The FBI has detected the actors collecting configuration files for thousands of networking devices associated with US entities across critical infrastructure sectors. The actors used the unauthorized access to conduct reconnaissance in the victim networks, which revealed their interest in protocols and applications commonly associated with industrial control systems. The same hacking group has previously targeted the networks of US state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) government organizations and aviation entities over the last decade.

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Information Snippets

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