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UNC5518 Access-as-a-Service Campaign via ClickFix and Fake CAPTCHA Pages

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4 unique sources, 16 articles

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The ClickFix malware campaign has evolved to include multi-OS support and video tutorials that guide victims through the self-infection process. The campaign, which uses fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages and malicious PowerShell scripts, has been observed deploying various payloads, including information stealers and backdoors. The FileFix attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, impersonates Meta account suspension warnings to trick users into installing the StealC infostealer malware. The campaign has evolved over two weeks with different payloads, domains, and lures, indicating an attacker testing and adapting their infrastructure. The FileFix technique, created by red team researcher mr. d0x, uses the address bar in File Explorer to execute malicious commands. The campaign employs steganography to hide a second-stage PowerShell script and encrypted executables inside a JPG image, which is believed to be AI-generated. The StealC malware targets credentials from various applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and cloud services, and can take screenshots of the active desktop. The FileFix attack uses a multilingual phishing site to trick users into executing a malicious command via the File Explorer address bar. The attack leverages Bitbucket to host the malicious components, abusing a legitimate source code hosting platform to bypass detection. The attack involves a multi-stage PowerShell script that downloads an image, decodes it into the next-stage payload, and runs a Go-based loader to launch StealC. The attack uses advanced obfuscation techniques, including junk code and fragmentation, to hinder analysis efforts. The FileFix attack is more likely to be detected by security products due to the payload being executed by the web browser used by the victim. The FileFix attack demonstrates significant investment in tradecraft, with carefully engineered phishing infrastructure, payload delivery, and supporting elements to maximize evasion and impact. The MetaStealer attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, uses a fake Cloudflare Turnstile lure and an MSI package disguised as a PDF to deploy the MetaStealer infostealer malware. The attack involves a multi-stage infection chain that includes a DLL sideloading technique using a legitimate SentinelOne executable. The MetaStealer attack targets crypto wallets and other sensitive information, using a combination of social engineering and technical evasion techniques to deploy malware. Recently, threat actors have been abusing the decades-old Finger protocol to retrieve and execute remote commands on Windows devices. The Finger protocol is used to deliver commands that create a random-named path, download a zip archive disguised as a PDF, and extract a Python malware package. The Python program is executed using pythonw.exe __init__.py, and a callback is made to the attacker's server to confirm execution. A related batch file indicates that the Python package is an infostealer. Another campaign uses the Finger protocol to retrieve and run commands that look for malware research tools and exit if found. If no malware analysis tools are found, the commands download a zip archive disguised as PDF files and extract the NetSupport Manager RAT package. The commands configure a scheduled task to launch the remote access malware when the user logs in. The Finger protocol abuse appears to be carried out by a single threat actor conducting ClickFix attacks. A new EVALUSION ClickFix campaign has been discovered, delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT. Amatera Stealer, an evolution of ACR Stealer, is available under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model and targets crypto-wallets, browsers, messaging applications, FTP clients, and email services. It employs advanced evasion techniques such as WoW64 SysCalls and is packed using PureCrypter. The stealer is injected into the MSBuild.exe process to harvest sensitive data and contact an external server to execute a PowerShell command to fetch and run NetSupport RAT. The campaign also involves phishing attacks using various malware families and phishing kits named Cephas and Tycoon 2FA. Tycoon 2FA is a phishing kit that bypasses multi-factor authentication (MFA) and authentication apps by intercepting usernames, passwords, session cookies, and MFA flows in real-time. It has been used in over 64,000 attacks this year, primarily targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Tycoon 2FA includes anti-detection layers and can lead to total session takeover, allowing attackers to move laterally into various enterprise systems. Legacy MFA methods are vulnerable to Tycoon 2FA, and phishing-proof MFA solutions like Token Ring and Token BioStick are recommended to prevent such attacks. A new operation embedding StealC V2 inside Blender project files has been observed targeting victims for at least six months. The attackers placed manipulated .blend files on platforms such as CGTrader, where users downloaded them as routine 3D assets. When opened with Blender’s Auto Run feature enabled, the files executed concealed Python scripts that launched a multistage infection. The infection chain began with a tampered Rig_Ui.py script embedded inside the .blend file. This script fetched a loader from a remote workers.dev domain, which then downloaded a PowerShell stage and two ZIP archives containing Python-based stealers. Once extracted into the Windows temp directory, the malware created LNK files to secure persistence, then used Pyramid C2 channels to retrieve encrypted payloads. StealC V2, promoted on underground forums since April 2025, has rapidly expanded its feature set. It now targets more than 23 browsers, over 100 plugins, more than 15 desktop wallets, and a range of messaging, VPN and mail clients. Its pricing, from $200 per month to $800 for 6 months, has made it accessible to low-tier cybercriminals seeking ready-to-use tools. ClickFix attack variants have been observed using a realistic-looking Windows Update animation in a full-screen browser page to trick users into executing malicious commands. The new ClickFix variants drop the LummaC2 and Rhadamanthys information stealers. The attack uses steganography to encode the final malware payload inside an image. The process involves multiple stages that use PowerShell code and a .NET assembly (the Stego Loader) responsible for reconstructing the final payload embedded inside a PNG file in an encrypted state. The shellcode holding the infostealer samples is packed using the Donut tool. The Rhadamanthys variant that used the Windows Update lure was first spotted by researchers back in October, before Operation Endgame took down parts of its infrastructure on November 13. A new campaign codenamed JackFix leverages fake adult websites (xHamster, PornHub clones) as its phishing mechanism, likely distributed via malvertising. The JackFix campaign displays highly convincing fake Windows update screens in an attempt to get the victim to run malicious code. The attack heavily leans on obfuscation to conceal ClickFix-related code and blocks users from escaping the full-screen alert by disabling the Escape and F11 buttons, along with F5 and F12 keys. The initial command executed is an MSHTA payload that's launched using the legitimate mshta.exe binary, which contains JavaScript designed to run a PowerShell command to retrieve another PowerShell script from a remote server. The PowerShell script attempts to elevate privileges and creates Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions for command-and-control (C2) addresses and paths where the payloads are staged. The PowerShell script serves up to eight different payloads, including Rhadamanthys Stealer, Vidar Stealer 2.0, RedLine Stealer, Amadey, and other unspecified loaders and RATs. The threat actor often changes the URI used to host the first mshta.exe stage and has been observed moving from hosting the second stage on the domain securitysettings.live to xoiiasdpsdoasdpojas.com, although both point to the same IP address 141.98.80.175. An initial access broker tracked as Storm-0249 is abusing endpoint detection and response solutions and trusted Microsoft Windows utilities to load malware, establish communication, and persistence in preparation for ransomware attacks. The threat actor has moved beyond mass phishing and adopted stealthier, more advanced methods that prove effective and difficult for defenders to counter. In one attack analyzed by researchers at cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, Storm-0249 leveraged the SentinelOne EDR components to hide malicious activity. The attack started with ClickFix social engineering that tricked users into pasting and executing curl commands in the Windows Run dialog to download a malicious MSI package with SYSTEM privileges. A malicious PowerShell script is also fetched from a spoofed Microsoft domain, which is piped straight onto the system's memory, never touching the disk and thus evading antivirus detection. The MSI file drops a malicious DLL (SentinelAgentCore.dll), which is placed strategically alongside the pre-existing, legitimate SentinelAgentWorker.exe, which is already installed as part of the victim's SentinelOne EDR. Next, the attacker loads the DLL using the signed SentinelAgentWorker (DLL sideloading), executing the file within the trusted, privileged EDR process and obtaining stealthy persistence that survives operating system updates. Once the attacker gains access, they use the SentinelOne component to collect system identifiers through legitimate Windows utilities like reg.exe and findstr.exe, and to funnel encrypted HTTPS command-and-control (C2) traffic. The compromised systems are profiled using 'MachineGuid,' a unique hardware-based identifier that ransomware groups like LockBit and ALPHV use for binding encryption keys to specific victims. The abuse of trusted, signed EDR processes bypasses nearly all traditional monitoring. The researchers recommend that system administrators rely on behavior-based detection that identifies trusted processes loading unsigned DLLs from non-standard paths. Furthermore, it is helpful to set stricter controls for curl, PowerShell, and LoLBin execution.

Timeline

  1. 17.11.2025 18:53 3 articles · 22d ago

    EVALUSION ClickFix campaign delivers Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT

    A new EVALUSION ClickFix campaign has been discovered, delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT. Amatera Stealer, an evolution of ACR Stealer, is available under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model and targets crypto-wallets, browsers, messaging applications, FTP clients, and email services. It employs advanced evasion techniques such as WoW64 SysCalls and is packed using PureCrypter. The stealer is injected into the MSBuild.exe process to harvest sensitive data and contact an external server to execute a PowerShell command to fetch and run NetSupport RAT. The campaign also involves phishing attacks using various malware families and phishing kits named Cephas and Tycoon 2FA. Tycoon 2FA is a phishing kit that bypasses multi-factor authentication (MFA) and authentication apps by intercepting usernames, passwords, session cookies, and MFA flows in real-time. It has been used in over 64,000 attacks this year, primarily targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. The kit includes anti-detection layers and can lead to total session takeover, allowing attackers to move laterally into various enterprise systems. Legacy MFA methods like SMS codes, push notifications, and TOTP apps are vulnerable to Tycoon 2FA due to their reliance on user behavior. Criminal groups such as Scattered Spider, Octo Tempest, and Storm 1167 are using Tycoon 2FA daily. Phishing-proof MFA solutions, such as Token Ring and Token BioStick, use biometric authentication, proximity-based checks, and domain binding to prevent phishing attacks. Token Ring and Token BioStick solutions are inexpensive, available today, and provide a better user experience with faster authentication times.

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  2. 17.09.2025 17:01 2 articles · 2mo ago

    MetaStealer attack uses fake Cloudflare Turnstile and MSI package

    The MetaStealer attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, uses a fake Cloudflare Turnstile lure and an MSI package disguised as a PDF to deploy the MetaStealer infostealer malware. The attack involves a multi-stage infection chain that includes a DLL sideloading technique using a legitimate SentinelOne executable. The MetaStealer attack targets crypto wallets and other sensitive information, using a combination of social engineering and technical evasion techniques to deploy malware.

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  3. 16.09.2025 15:00 8 articles · 2mo ago

    FileFix attack impersonates Meta and deploys StealC infostealer

    A Russian-linked campaign delivers the StealC V2 information stealer malware through malicious Blender files uploaded to 3D model marketplaces like CGTrader. The campaign exploits Blender's Auto Run feature to execute embedded Python scripts that fetch a malware loader from a Cloudflare Workers domain. The loader then retrieves a PowerShell script that downloads two ZIP archives, which unpack into the %TEMP% folder and drop LNK files in the Startup directory for persistence. The campaign deploys two payloads: the StealC infostealer and an auxiliary Python stealer. The StealC malware used in this campaign is the latest variant of the second major version, with expanded data-stealing capabilities and support for exfiltration from various browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, messaging apps, VPN clients, and mail clients. Despite being documented since 2023, the malware remains elusive to anti-virus products, with no security engine on VirusTotal detecting the analyzed variant. The campaign has been active for at least six months, involving the implantation of malicious .blend files on platforms like CGTrader. The attack chains involve uploading malicious .blend files containing a malicious "Rig_Ui.py" script, which is executed as soon as the files are opened with Blender's Auto Run feature enabled. The Rig_Ui.py script fetches a PowerShell script to download two ZIP archives, one of which contains a payload for StealC V2, while the second archive deploys a secondary Python-based stealer on the compromised host. The updated version of StealC supports a wide range of information gathering features, allowing data to be extracted from various browsers, web plugins, cryptocurrency wallet apps, messaging services, VPNs, and email clients. The campaign shares similarities with a prior campaign linked to Russian-speaking threat actors, involving impersonating the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) to target the online gaming community and infect them with StealC and Pyramid C2. Blender's documentation acknowledges the security risk posed by the ability to include Python scripts within blend-files, which can execute arbitrary Python scripts.

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  4. 21.08.2025 19:25 8 articles · 3mo ago

    UNC5518 Access-as-a-Service Campaign via ClickFix and Fake CAPTCHA Pages

    The ClickFix attacks now feature videos that guide victims through the self-infection process, a timer to pressure targets into taking risky actions, and automatic detection of the operating system to provide the correct commands. The attacks are primarily promoted through malvertizing on Google Search and exploit known flaws on outdated WordPress plugins to compromise legitimate sites. The payloads delivered in these attacks include MSHTA executable, PowerShell scripts, and living-off-the-land binaries. Additionally, threat actors have been abusing the decades-old Finger protocol to retrieve and execute remote commands on Windows devices. The Finger protocol is used to deliver commands that create a random-named path, download a zip archive disguised as a PDF, and extract a Python malware package. The Python program is executed using pythonw.exe __init__.py, and a callback is made to the attacker's server to confirm execution. A related batch file indicates that the Python package is an infostealer. Another campaign uses the Finger protocol to retrieve and run commands that look for malware research tools and exit if found. If no malware analysis tools are found, the commands download a zip archive disguised as PDF files and extract the NetSupport Manager RAT package. The commands configure a scheduled task to launch the remote access malware when the user logs in. The Finger protocol abuse appears to be carried out by a single threat actor conducting ClickFix attacks. A new EVALUSION ClickFix campaign has been discovered, delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT. Amatera Stealer, an evolution of ACR Stealer, is available under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model and targets crypto-wallets, browsers, messaging applications, FTP clients, and email services. It employs advanced evasion techniques such as WoW64 SysCalls and is packed using PureCrypter. The stealer is injected into the MSBuild.exe process to harvest sensitive data and contact an external server to execute a PowerShell command to fetch and run NetSupport RAT. ClickFix attack variants have been observed using a realistic-looking Windows Update animation in a full-screen browser page to trick users into executing malicious commands. The new ClickFix variants drop the LummaC2 and Rhadamanthys information stealers. The attack uses steganography to encode the final malware payload inside an image. The process involves multiple stages that use PowerShell code and a .NET assembly (the Stego Loader) responsible for reconstructing the final payload embedded inside a PNG file in an encrypted state. The shellcode holding the infostealer samples is packed using the Donut tool. The Rhadamanthys variant that used the Windows Update lure was first spotted by researchers back in October, before Operation Endgame took down parts of its infrastructure on November 13. A new campaign codenamed JackFix leverages fake adult websites (xHamster, PornHub clones) as its phishing mechanism, likely distributed via malvertising. The JackFix campaign displays highly convincing fake Windows update screens in an attempt to get the victim to run malicious code. The attack heavily leans on obfuscation to conceal ClickFix-related code and blocks users from escaping the full-screen alert by disabling the Escape and F11 buttons, along with F5 and F12 keys. The initial command executed is an MSHTA payload that's launched using the legitimate mshta.exe binary, which contains JavaScript designed to run a PowerShell command to retrieve another PowerShell script from a remote server. The PowerShell script attempts to elevate privileges and creates Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions for command-and-control (C2) addresses and paths where the payloads are staged. The PowerShell script serves up to eight different payloads, including Rhadamanthys Stealer, Vidar Stealer 2.0, RedLine Stealer, Amadey, and other unspecified loaders and RATs. The threat actor often changes the URI used to host the first mshta.exe stage and has been observed moving from hosting the second stage on the domain securitysettings.live to xoiiasdpsdoasdpojas.com, although both point to the same IP address 141.98.80.175. An initial access broker tracked as Storm-0249 is abusing endpoint detection and response solutions and trusted Microsoft Windows utilities to load malware, establish communication, and persistence in preparation for ransomware attacks. The threat actor has moved beyond mass phishing and adopted stealthier, more advanced methods that prove effective and difficult for defenders to counter. In one attack analyzed by researchers at cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, Storm-0249 leveraged the SentinelOne EDR components to hide malicious activity. The attack started with ClickFix social engineering that tricked users into pasting and executing curl commands in the Windows Run dialog to download a malicious MSI package with SYSTEM privileges. A malicious PowerShell script is also fetched from a spoofed Microsoft domain, which is piped straight onto the system's memory, never touching the disk and thus evading antivirus detection. The MSI file drops a malicious DLL (SentinelAgentCore.dll), which is placed strategically alongside the pre-existing, legitimate SentinelAgentWorker.exe, which is already installed as part of the victim's SentinelOne EDR. Next, the attacker loads the DLL using the signed SentinelAgentWorker (DLL sideloading), executing the file within the trusted, privileged EDR process and obtaining stealthy persistence that survives operating system updates. Once the attacker gains access, they use the SentinelOne component to collect system identifiers through legitimate Windows utilities like reg.exe and findstr.exe, and to funnel encrypted HTTPS command-and-control (C2) traffic. The compromised systems are profiled using 'MachineGuid,' a unique hardware-based identifier that ransomware groups like LockBit and ALPHV use for binding encryption keys to specific victims. The abuse of trusted, signed EDR processes bypasses nearly all traditional monitoring. The researchers recommend that system administrators rely on behavior-based detection that identifies trusted processes loading unsigned DLLs from non-standard paths. Furthermore, it is helpful to set stricter controls for curl, PowerShell, and LoLBin execution.

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