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UNC5518 deploys CORNFLAKE.V3 backdoor via ClickFix and fake CAPTCHA pages

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πŸ“° 2 unique sources, 2 articles

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UNC5518, an access-as-a-service threat actor, deploys the CORNFLAKE.V3 backdoor using the ClickFix social engineering tactic and fake CAPTCHA pages. This backdoor is used by at least two other groups, UNC5774 and UNC4108, to initiate multi-stage infections and drop additional payloads. The attack begins with users being tricked into running a malicious PowerShell script via a fake CAPTCHA page. The script executes a dropper payload that ultimately launches CORNFLAKE.V3, which supports various payload types and collects system information. The backdoor has been observed in both JavaScript and PHP versions and uses Cloudflare tunnels to avoid detection. A new ClickFix variant manipulates AI-generated text summaries to deliver malicious commands, turning AI tools into active participants in social engineering attacks.

Timeline

  1. 25.08.2025 22:32 πŸ“° 1 articles

    ClickFix exploits AI-generated summaries for malware delivery

    A new ClickFix variant manipulates AI-generated text summaries to deliver malicious commands. This variant uses CSS obfuscation and 'prompt overdose' to hide malicious code, making it more likely for victims to follow the instructions without suspicion. AI summarizers can turn into active participants in social engineering attacks, highlighting the evolving tactics of social engineering and the importance of robust security measures. Organizations are advised to preprocess HTML, use prompt sanitizers, and implement payload pattern recognition to combat this threat.

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  2. 21.08.2025 19:25 πŸ“° 2 articles

    UNC5518 deploys CORNFLAKE.V3 backdoor via ClickFix and fake CAPTCHA pages

    UNC5518, an access-as-a-service threat actor, deploys the CORNFLAKE.V3 backdoor using the ClickFix social engineering tactic and fake CAPTCHA pages. This backdoor is used by at least two other groups, UNC5774 and UNC4108, to initiate multi-stage infections and drop additional payloads. The attack begins with users being tricked into running a malicious PowerShell script via a fake CAPTCHA page. The script executes a dropper payload that ultimately launches CORNFLAKE.V3, which supports various payload types and collects system information. The backdoor has been observed in both JavaScript and PHP versions and uses Cloudflare tunnels to avoid detection.

    Show sources

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