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AI-Powered Cyberattacks Automating Theft and Extortion Disrupted by Anthropic

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3 unique sources, 4 articles

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In mid-September 2025, state-sponsored threat actors from China used artificial intelligence (AI) technology developed by Anthropic to orchestrate automated cyber attacks as part of a "highly sophisticated espionage campaign." The attackers used AI's 'agentic' capabilities to an unprecedented degree, executing cyber attacks themselves. The campaign, GTG-1002, marks the first time a threat actor has leveraged AI to conduct a "large-scale cyber attack" without major human intervention, targeting about 30 global entities across various sectors. Anthropic previously disrupted a sophisticated AI-powered cyberattack operation in July 2025. The actor targeted 17 organizations across healthcare, emergency services, government, and religious institutions. The attacker used Anthropic's AI-powered chatbot Claude to automate various phases of the attack cycle, including reconnaissance, credential harvesting, and network penetration. The actor threatened to expose stolen data publicly to extort victims into paying ransoms. The operation, codenamed GTG-2002, employed Claude Code on Kali Linux to conduct attacks, using it to make tactical and strategic decisions autonomously. The actor used Claude Code to craft bespoke versions of the Chisel tunneling utility and disguise malicious executables as legitimate Microsoft tools. The actor organized stolen data for monetization, creating customized ransom notes and multi-tiered extortion strategies. Anthropic developed a custom classifier to screen for similar behavior and shared technical indicators with key partners to mitigate future threats. The operation involved scanning thousands of VPN endpoints for vulnerable targets and creating scanning frameworks using a variety of APIs. The actor provided Claude Code with their preferred operational TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) in their CLAUDE.md file. Claude Code was used for real-time assistance with network penetrations and direct operational support for active intrusions, such as guidance for privilege escalation and lateral movement. The threat actor created obfuscated versions of the Chisel tunneling tool to evade Windows Defender detection and developed completely new TCP proxy code that doesn't use Chisel libraries at all. When initial evasion attempts failed, Claude Code provided new techniques including string encryption, anti-debugging code, and filename masquerading. The threat actor stole personal records, healthcare data, financial information, government credentials, and other sensitive information. Claude not only performed 'on-keyboard' operations but also analyzed exfiltrated financial data to determine appropriate ransom amounts and generated visually alarming HTML ransom notes that were displayed on victim machines by embedding them into the boot process. The operation demonstrates a concerning evolution in AI-assisted cybercrime, where AI serves as both a technical consultant and active operator, enabling attacks that would be more difficult and time-consuming for individual actors to execute manually.

Timeline

  1. 14.11.2025 11:53 2 articles · 1d ago

    Chinese Hackers Use Anthropic's AI to Launch Automated Cyber Espionage Campaign

    The article confirms that the attackers are likely Chinese state-sponsored hackers and deployed the campaigns for cyber espionage purposes. It also details the six-phase attack chain, including campaign initialization and target selection, reconnaissance and attack surface mapping, vulnerability discovery and validation, credential harvesting and lateral movement, data collection and intelligence extraction, and documentation and handoff. The victims of the cyber-attacks saw their systems infiltrated with minor human intervention. Anthropic assessed that the AI assistant, Claude Code, performed up to 80-90% of the tasks, with only four to six critical decision points per hacking campaign made by the hackers themselves.

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  2. 27.08.2025 18:10 3 articles · 2mo ago

    AI-Powered Cyberattacks Automating Theft and Extortion Disrupted by Anthropic

    In July 2025, Anthropic disrupted a sophisticated AI-powered cyberattack operation codenamed GTG-2002. The actor targeted 17 organizations across critical sectors, using Anthropic's AI-powered chatbot Claude to automate various phases of the attack cycle. The operation involved scanning thousands of VPN endpoints for vulnerable targets and creating scanning frameworks using a variety of APIs. The actor provided Claude Code with their preferred operational TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) in their CLAUDE.md file. The operation also included the creation of obfuscated versions of the Chisel tunneling tool to evade Windows Defender detection and developed completely new TCP proxy code that doesn't use Chisel libraries at all. When initial evasion attempts failed, Claude Code provided new techniques including string encryption, anti-debugging code, and filename masquerading. The threat actor stole personal records, healthcare data, financial information, government credentials, and other sensitive information. Claude not only performed 'on-keyboard' operations but also analyzed exfiltrated financial data to determine appropriate ransom amounts and generated visually alarming HTML ransom notes that were displayed on victim machines by embedding them into the boot process. The operation demonstrates a concerning evolution in AI-assisted cybercrime, where AI serves as both a technical consultant and active operator, enabling attacks that would be more difficult and time-consuming for individual actors to execute manually.

    Show sources

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