CISA and Partners Respond to Cyber Attack on Nevada's Essential Services

A U.S. federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agency was breached in July 2024 after attackers exploited an unpatched GeoServer instance. The attackers gained initial access through a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2024-36401) and moved laterally within the network, deploying web shells and scripts for persistence and privilege escalation. The breach remained undetected for three weeks until the agency's Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool alerted the Security Operations Center (SOC). The attackers exploited the vulnerability in GeoServer, which was patched in June 2024 but remained unpatched in the agency's environment. They used brute force techniques for lateral movement and privilege escalation, accessing service accounts and deploying web shells like China Chopper. The breach highlights the importance of timely patching, continuous monitoring of EDR alerts, and comprehensive incident response plans. The attackers discovered the vulnerable GeoServer instances by conducting network scanning with Burp Suite. They exploited the vulnerability to gain access to a public-facing GeoServer instance and downloaded open-source scripts and tools for lateral movement. On July 24, 2024, the attackers exploited the same vulnerability to gain access to a second GeoServer instance and moved laterally to a Web server and SQL server, where they dropped web shells, including China Chopper. The attackers also used Stowaway for command-and-control (C2) traffic and attempted to exploit CVE-2016-5195 for privilege escalation. The agency's incident response plan was inadequate, and some public-facing resources lacked endpoint protection, allowing the breach to remain undetected for three weeks.

Chinese state-sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors, specifically the Salt Typhoon group and a newly identified group named RedNovember, have been conducting sustained campaigns to compromise critical infrastructure networks worldwide. The campaigns aim to gain long-term access to telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military networks. This activity has been detailed in a joint advisory by CISA, NSA, FBI, and international partners, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. The advisory provides intelligence on tactics used by these actors and recommends mitigations to strengthen defenses. The Czech Republic's National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NUKIB) has issued a warning instructing critical infrastructure organizations to avoid using Chinese technology or transferring user data to servers located in China. The agency has re-evaluated its risk estimate of significant disruptions caused by China, now assessing it at a 'High' level. The NUKIB has confirmed malicious activities of Chinese cyber-actors targeting the Czech Republic, including a recent APT31 campaign targeting the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The advisory highlights concerns over the transfer of system and user data to China, potentially misused by state, military, or political interests. The Czech government previously accused China of targeting its critical infrastructure through APT 31, an allegation denied by the PRC but condemned by the US, EU, and NATO. The advisory suggests that individuals and organizations consider restricting or prohibiting the use of products and services that transfer data to China. The campaign has targeted at least 600 organizations across 80 countries, including 200 in the U.S. The threat actors have exploited vulnerabilities in Cisco, Ivanti, and Palo Alto Networks devices to gain initial access and have modified routers to maintain persistent access and pivot into other networks. The advisory also notes that the APT actors may target other devices such as Fortinet firewalls, Juniper firewalls, Microsoft Exchange, Nokia routers and switches, Sierra Wireless devices, Sonicwall firewalls, etc. RedNovember has targeted perimeter appliances of high-profile organizations globally, including defense and aerospace organizations, space organizations, and law firms. The group has breached at least two U.S. defense contractors, a European engine manufacturer, and a trade-focused intergovernmental cooperation body in Southeast Asia. RedNovember has used the Go-based backdoor Pantegana and Cobalt Strike as part of its intrusions, along with the Spark RAT and LESLIELOADER. The group has also used VPN services like ExpressVPN and Warp VPN to administer and connect to servers used for exploitation and communication.

Russian hackers, tracked as Static Tundra and associated with the FSB's Center 16 or Military Unit 71330, have been exploiting a seven-year-old vulnerability (CVE-2018-0171) in unpatched end-of-life Cisco networking devices to target enterprise and critical infrastructure networks in the U.S. and abroad. The attacks, ongoing since at least August 2024, have compromised thousands of devices, allowing the attackers to collect configuration files, change settings, and gain unauthorized access. The U.S. Department of State is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information on three FSB officers involved in these cyberattacks. The targets include organizations in the manufacturing, telecommunications, higher education, and energy sectors. The attackers use stolen SNMP credentials to control compromised devices, enabling them to run commands, change settings, and steal configurations while evading detection. They also create new local user accounts and enable remote access services like Telnet to maintain access. The attacks highlight the persistent threat of unpatched vulnerabilities and the need for robust cybersecurity measures to protect critical infrastructure. The three FSB officers, Marat Valeryevich Tyukov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov, and Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov, targeted more than 380 foreign energy-sector companies in 135 countries. The suspects targeted American and foreign oil and gas firms, nuclear power plants, renewable energy firms, utility and electrical grid entities, consulting and engineering groups, and advanced technology companies. In August 2021, these officers were indicted in the US with charges of computer fraud and abuse, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The Dragonfly campaign involved obtaining persistent access to victim networks and infecting them with the Havex malware through supply chain compromise. In the second phase, known as Dragonfly 2.0, the three allegedly targeted over 3,300 users at more than 500 US and international companies and entities, including US government agencies, in spear-phishing attacks.

The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) faces funding cuts that will expire on September 30, 2025, potentially leaving state and local governments vulnerable to cyberattacks. Recent ransomware attacks on Nevada, St. Paul, the Lower Sioux Indian Community, and Pennsylvania underscore the growing threat to local governments. MS-ISAC, which detected over 40,000 potential cyberattacks in 2024, will have to start charging for its services without federal funding. This includes cyber threat analysis and threat intelligence distribution to critical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and utilities. The Center for Internet Security (CIS), which operates MS-ISAC, has been temporarily funding the center at a cost of over $1 million per month. Without reinstated funding, the MS-ISAC's services will be at risk, leaving many state and local governments unable to maintain the security of their public services.