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VerifTools Fake-ID Marketplace Seized and Relaunched

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The VerifTools marketplace, which sold fraudulent identity documents, was seized by authorities in the Netherlands and the United States. The operators have since relaunched the service on a new domain. The VerifTools marketplace was used to generate counterfeit identification documents for all 50 U.S. states and various foreign countries. The FBI linked approximately $6.4 million in illicit proceeds to the platform. The seizure involved taking down two domains and a blog, redirecting visitors to a notice from the FBI. Despite the takedown, the operators relaunched the service on a new domain, veriftools[.]com, on August 28, 2025. VerifTools was used to bypass identity verification systems, facilitating unauthorized access to online accounts and cryptocurrency theft.

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  1. 29.08.2025 12:05 📰 1 articles

    VerifTools Fake-ID Marketplace Seized and Relaunched

    On August 28, 2025, authorities in the Netherlands and the United States seized the VerifTools marketplace, which sold fraudulent identity documents. The seizure involved taking down two domains and a blog, redirecting visitors to an FBI notice. The operators relaunched the service on the domain veriftools[.]com. The FBI linked approximately $6.4 million in illicit proceeds to the platform. The Dutch National Police confiscated multiple servers and secured the website's infrastructure for analysis.

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