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Silver Fox Exploits Microsoft-Signed WatchDog Driver to Deploy ValleyRAT Malware

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Last updated
2 unique sources, 4 articles

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The threat actor Silver Fox has been exploiting a previously unknown vulnerable driver associated with WatchDog Anti-malware to deploy ValleyRAT malware. The driver, 'amsdk.sys' (version 1.0.600), is a validly signed Windows kernel device driver built on the Zemana Anti-Malware SDK. This driver allows arbitrary process termination and local privilege escalation, enabling the attackers to neutralize endpoint protection products and deploy the ValleyRAT remote access trojan. The campaign, first observed in late May 2025, targets Chinese-speaking victims using various social engineering techniques and trojanized software. The WatchDog driver has been patched, but attackers have adapted by modifying the driver to bypass hash-based blocklists. Silver Fox, also known as SwimSnake and UTG-Q-1000, is highly active and organized, targeting domestic users and companies to steal secrets and defraud victims. Recently, a newly identified cryptojacking campaign has been uncovered, spreading through pirated software installers. This campaign deploys system-level malware using a customised XMRig miner and a controller component for persistence. The controller, named Explorer.exe, functions as a state-driven orchestrator. The malware includes a hardcoded expiration date of December 23, 2025, for self-removal. The campaign uses a vulnerable signed driver, WinRing0x64.sys, to gain kernel-level access and modifies CPU registers to disable hardware prefetchers, boosting mining performance. The campaign connects to the Kryptex mining pool at xmr-sg.kryptex.network:8029.

Timeline

  1. 18.02.2026 18:00 1 articles · 7h ago

    Cryptojacking Campaign Exploits Driver to Boost Monero Mining

    A newly identified cryptojacking campaign spreads through pirated software installers, deploying system-level malware. The campaign uses a customised XMRig miner and a controller component for persistence. The controller, named Explorer.exe, functions as a state-driven orchestrator. The malware includes a hardcoded expiration date of December 23, 2025, for self-removal. The campaign uses a vulnerable signed driver, WinRing0x64.sys, to gain kernel-level access and modifies CPU registers to disable hardware prefetchers, boosting mining performance. The campaign connects to the Kryptex mining pool at xmr-sg.kryptex.network:8029.

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  2. 30.12.2025 12:46 1 articles · 1mo ago

    Silver Fox Targets Indian Users With Tax-Themed Emails Delivering ValleyRAT Malware

    Silver Fox has turned its focus to India, using income tax-themed lures in phishing campaigns to distribute ValleyRAT (aka Winos 4.0). The phishing emails contain decoy PDFs purported to be from India's Income Tax Department. Opening the PDF attachment takes the recipient to the "ggwk[.]cc" domain, from where a ZIP file ("tax affairs.zip") is downloaded. The ZIP file contains a Nullsoft Scriptable Install system (NSIS) installer ("tax affairs.exe"), which leverages a legitimate executable associated with Thunder ("thunder.exe"), and a rogue DLL ("libexpat.dll") that's sideloaded by the binary. The DLL disables the Windows Update service and serves as a conduit for a Donut loader, performing various anti-analysis and anti-sandbox checks. The lander injects the final ValleyRAT payload into a hollowed "explorer.exe" process. ValleyRAT is designed to communicate with an external server and await further commands, implementing a plugin-oriented architecture for keylogging, credential harvesting, and defense evasion. Silver Fox has leveraged SEO poisoning to distribute backdoor installers of at least 20 widely used applications, including communication tools, VPNs, and productivity apps. The bogus sites created by Silver Fox have been found to impersonate various popular applications, with infections dating back to July 2025. The findings coincide with a recent report from ReliaQuest, which attributed the hacking group to a false flag operation mimicking a Russian threat actor.

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  3. 04.12.2025 19:25 2 articles · 2mo ago

    Silver Fox Uses Fake Microsoft Teams Installer to Spread ValleyRAT Malware in China

    Silver Fox has been spotted orchestrating a false flag operation to mimic a Russian threat group in attacks targeting organizations in China. The campaign leverages Microsoft Teams lures to trick users into downloading a malicious setup file that leads to the deployment of ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0). The activity has been underway since November 2025. The malicious setup file is a ZIP archive named "MSTчamsSetup.zip" retrieved from an Alibaba Cloud URL. The malware scans running processes for binaries related to 360 Total Security, configures Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions, and writes a trojanized version of the Microsoft installer to the "AppData\Local\" path. The malware writes additional files including "AppData\Local\Profiler.json," "AppData\Roaming\Embarcadero\GPUCache2.xml," "AppData\Roaming\Embarcadero\GPUCache.xml," and "AppData\Roaming\Embarcadero\AutoRecoverDat.dll." The malware loads data from "Profiler.json" and "GPUcache.xml," and launches the malicious DLL into the memory of "rundll32.exe." The malware establishes a connection to an external server to fetch the final payload to facilitate remote control.

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  4. 02.09.2025 11:39 4 articles · 5mo ago

    Silver Fox Exploits Microsoft-Signed WatchDog Driver to Deploy ValleyRAT Malware

    The threat actor Silver Fox has been exploiting a previously unknown vulnerable driver associated with WatchDog Anti-malware to deploy ValleyRAT malware. The driver, 'amsdk.sys' (version 1.0.600), is a validly signed Windows kernel device driver built on the Zemana Anti-Malware SDK. This driver allows arbitrary process termination and local privilege escalation, enabling the attackers to neutralize endpoint protection products and deploy the ValleyRAT remote access trojan. The campaign, first observed in late May 2025, targets Chinese-speaking victims using various social engineering techniques and trojanized software. The WatchDog driver has been patched, but attackers have adapted by modifying the driver to bypass hash-based blocklists. Silver Fox, also known as SwimSnake and UTG-Q-1000, is highly active and organized, targeting domestic users and companies to steal secrets and defraud victims. A newly identified cryptojacking campaign has been uncovered, spreading through pirated software installers. This campaign deploys system-level malware using a customised XMRig miner and a controller component for persistence. The controller, named Explorer.exe, functions as a state-driven orchestrator. The malware includes a hardcoded expiration date of December 23, 2025, for self-removal. The campaign uses a vulnerable signed driver, WinRing0x64.sys, to gain kernel-level access and modifies CPU registers to disable hardware prefetchers, boosting mining performance. The campaign connects to the Kryptex mining pool at xmr-sg.kryptex.network:8029.

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Information Snippets

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