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SVG Files Used to Deploy Phishing Pages in Colombian Judicial System Impersonation Campaign

First reported
Last updated
πŸ“° 2 unique sources, 2 articles

Summary

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A malware campaign leveraging SVG files to deploy Base64-encoded phishing pages impersonating the Colombian judicial system has been identified. The SVG files, distributed via email, execute JavaScript payloads to inject phishing pages and download ZIP archives. The campaign involves 523 unique SVG files that have evaded detection by antivirus engines. The earliest sample dates back to August 14, 2025. The campaign highlights the evolving tactics used by threat actors to bypass security measures and target macOS systems with information stealers like Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS). This campaign also coincides with broader trends in cyber threats targeting macOS and gamers.

Timeline

  1. 06.09.2025 21:58 πŸ“° 1 articles

    VirusTotal Identifies 523 SVG Files in Campaign

    VirusTotal discovered a phishing campaign hidden in SVG files that impersonate Colombia's judicial system to deliver malware. The campaign uses SVG files to render fake portals simulating a document download process, ultimately prompting users to download a password-protected ZIP archive. The extracted file contains a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL, and two encrypted files. The malicious DLL is sideloaded to install further malware on the system. VirusTotal identified 523 previously uploaded SVG files that were part of the same campaign but had evaded detection by security software. The addition of SVG support to AI Code Insights was crucial in exposing this campaign, as it helped identify new malicious campaigns more efficiently.

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  2. 05.09.2025 09:13 πŸ“° 1 articles

    SVG Files Used to Deploy Phishing Pages in Colombian Judicial System Impersonation Campaign

    A malware campaign leveraging SVG files to deploy Base64-encoded phishing pages impersonating the Colombian judicial system has been identified. The SVG files, distributed via email, execute JavaScript payloads to inject phishing pages and download ZIP archives. The campaign involves 44 unique SVG files that have evaded detection by antivirus engines. The earliest sample dates back to August 14, 2025.

    Show sources

Information Snippets

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