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Malicious Browser Extensions Target Meta Business Accounts

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1 unique sources, 1 articles

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Cybersecurity researchers have identified two campaigns using fake browser extensions to hijack Meta Business accounts. The extensions, disguised as legitimate tools for Facebook and Instagram verification and ad optimization, steal session cookies and credentials. The attackers target Meta advertisers to sell hijacked accounts on underground forums or repurpose them for further malicious activities. The campaigns are linked to Vietnamese-speaking threat actors and exploit legitimate cloud services and the Chrome Web Store. The first campaign involves fake 'Meta Verified' extensions named SocialMetrics Pro, distributed via malicious ads and fake websites. The second campaign uses rogue Chrome extensions disguised as AI-powered ad optimization tools, including Madgicx Plus and Meta Ads SuperTool. Both campaigns aim to steal sensitive data and compromise Meta Business accounts.

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  1. 11.09.2025 12:05 1 articles · 18d ago

    Fake Browser Extensions Target Meta Business Accounts

    Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed two campaigns using fake browser extensions to hijack Meta Business accounts. The first campaign involves the SocialMetrics Pro extension, distributed via malicious ads and fake websites. The second campaign uses rogue Chrome extensions like Madgicx Plus, promoted as AI-powered ad optimization tools. Both campaigns aim to steal sensitive data and compromise Meta Business accounts, with the end goal of selling hijacked accounts on underground forums or using them for further malicious activities.

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