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ScreenConnect Abused for Network Intrusions by APT Groups

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2 unique sources, 2 articles

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Advanced persistent threat (APT) groups and cybercriminals continue to exploit the remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool ScreenConnect for unauthorized system access, leveraging its legitimate features for persistence and lateral movement. A major malvertising campaign active since January 2026 has specifically targeted U.S. tax filers via Google Ads, delivering rogue ScreenConnect installers that deploy a custom EDR-killing driver (HwAudKiller) using a signed Huawei vulnerable driver (HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys) to blind security tools. The attack chain uses commercial cloaking services (Adspect, JustCloakIt) to evade detection and quickly stacks multiple RMM tools (ScreenConnect, FleetDeck Agent) for redundancy. Observed post-compromise activity includes credential dumping via LSASS access and lateral movement with tools like NetExec, aligning with pre-ransomware or initial access broker behavior. Defenders should prioritize monitoring for rogue ScreenConnect installers delivered via malvertising, kernel-mode driver loads from vulnerable Huawei audio drivers, rapid stacking of multiple RMM tools, and use of EDR killers alongside LSASS memory dumps and lateral movement artifacts.

Timeline

  1. 13.10.2025 18:45 2 articles · 5mo ago

    APT Groups Exploit ScreenConnect for Network Intrusions

    APT groups have been observed exploiting the RMM tool ScreenConnect to gain unauthorized access to systems, leveraging its legitimate features such as unattended access and file transfer to establish persistence and move laterally. The ScreenConnect client runs mainly in memory, evading basic antivirus scans, and attackers use custom URLs and invite links for phishing. Key event logs and configuration files have been identified to aid in detecting and investigating these intrusions. A large-scale malvertising campaign active since January 2026 has abused Google Ads to serve rogue ScreenConnect installers targeting U.S.-based individuals searching for tax-related documents. The campaign delivers a BYOVD EDR killer (HwAudKiller) using a signed Huawei audio driver (HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys) that terminates security processes in kernel mode, bypassing user-mode protections. The attack chain employs commercial cloaking services (Adspect, JustCloakIt) and rapidly deploys multiple RMM tools (ScreenConnect, FleetDeck Agent) for redundancy. Post-compromise activity includes credential dumping via LSASS access, lateral movement with NetExec, and alignment with pre-ransomware or initial access broker behavior. Russian-language artifacts in the actor's infrastructure suggest a Russian-speaking developer.

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