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MuddyWater Expands Global Campaigns with New Backdoors Targeting US and Israeli Entities

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Last updated
3 unique sources, 8 articles

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The MuddyWater threat actor, linked to Iran and also known as Static Kitten, Mercury, and Seedworm, has conducted a global phishing campaign targeting over 100 organizations, including government entities, embassies, diplomatic missions, foreign affairs ministries, consulates, international organizations, and telecommunications firms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The campaign used compromised email accounts to send phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word documents containing macros that dropped and launched the Phoenix backdoor, version 4. This backdoor provided remote control over infected systems. The campaign was active starting August 19, 2025, and used a command-and-control (C2) server registered under the domain screenai[.]online. The attackers employed three remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools and a custom browser credential stealer, Chromium_Stealer. The malware and tools were hosted on a temporary Python-based HTTP service linked to NameCheap's servers. The campaign highlights the ongoing use of trusted communication channels by state-backed threat actors to evade defenses and infiltrate high-value targets. The server and server-side command-and-control (C2) component were taken down on August 24, 2025, likely indicating a new stage of the attack. The MuddyWater threat actor has also targeted Israeli entities spanning academia, engineering, local government, manufacturing, technology, transportation, and utilities sectors. The hacking group has delivered a previously undocumented backdoor called MuddyViper. The attacks also singled out one technology company based in Egypt. The attack chains involve spear-phishing and the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in VPN infrastructure to infiltrate networks and deploy legitimate remote management tools. The campaign uses a loader named Fooder that decrypts and executes the C/C++-based MuddyViper backdoor. The MuddyViper backdoor enables the attackers to collect system information, execute files and shell commands, transfer files, and exfiltrate Windows login credentials and browser data. Additionally, the MuddyWater threat actor has deployed a new backdoor called UDPGangster that uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for command-and-control (C2) purposes. The attack chain involves using spear-phishing tactics to distribute booby-trapped Microsoft Word documents that trigger the execution of a malicious payload once macros are enabled. The phishing messages impersonate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs and purport to invite recipients to an online seminar titled "Presidential Elections and Results." The VBA script in the dropper file is equipped to conceal any sign of malicious activity by displaying a Hebrew-language decoy image from Israeli telecommunications provider Bezeq about supposed disconnection periods in the first week of November 2025 across various cities in the country. UDPGangster establishes persistence through Windows Registry modifications and boasts of various anti-analysis checks to resist efforts made by security researchers to take it apart. UDPGangster connects to an external server ("157.20.182[.]75") over UDP port 1269 to exfiltrate collected data, run commands using "cmd.exe," transmit files, update C2 server, and drop and execute additional payloads. The MuddyWater threat actor has launched a new campaign targeting diplomatic, maritime, financial, and telecom entities in the Middle East with a Rust-based implant codenamed RustyWater. The campaign uses icon spoofing and malicious Word documents to deliver Rust-based implants capable of asynchronous C2, anti-analysis, registry persistence, and modular post-compromise capability expansion. The RustyWater implant gathers victim machine information, detects installed security software, sets up persistence by means of a Windows Registry key, and establishes contact with a command-and-control (C2) server (nomercys.it[.]com) to facilitate file operations and command execution. The RustyWater implant is also referred to as Archer RAT and RUSTRIC. The use of RUSTRIC was previously flagged by Seqrite Labs as part of attacks targeting IT, MSPs, human resources, and software development companies in Israel. Historically, MuddyWater has relied on PowerShell and VBS loaders for initial access and post-compromise operations, but the introduction of Rust-based implants represents a notable tooling evolution toward more structured, modular, and low noise RAT capabilities. The MuddyWater threat actor has launched a new campaign codenamed Operation Olalampo targeting organizations and individuals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The campaign involves the deployment of new malware families including GhostFetch, HTTP_VIP, CHAR, and GhostBackDoor. GhostFetch is a first-stage downloader that profiles the system, validates mouse movements, checks screen resolution, and fetches and executes secondary payloads directly in memory. GhostBackDoor is a second-stage backdoor delivered by GhostFetch that supports an interactive shell, file read/write, and re-run GhostFetch. HTTP_VIP is a native downloader that conducts system reconnaissance and deploys AnyDesk from the C2 server. CHAR is a Rust backdoor controlled by a Telegram bot (username "stager_51_bot") that executes cmd.exe or PowerShell commands. The PowerShell command executed by CHAR is designed to execute a SOCKS5 reverse proxy or another backdoor named Kalim, upload data stolen from web browsers, and run unknown executables referred to as "sh.exe" and "gshdoc_release_X64_GUI.exe." The MuddyWater threat actor has been observed exploiting recently disclosed vulnerabilities on public-facing servers to obtain initial access to target networks. The MuddyWater APT group remains an active threat within the MENA region, with this operation primarily targeting organizations in the MENA region. The MuddyWater threat actor has targeted US companies in a new campaign that started in early February 2026. The campaign involves a previously unknown backdoor dubbed 'Dindoor' by cyber threat researchers. The Dindoor backdoor leverages Deno, the secure runtime for JavaScript and TypeScript, to execute. The backdoor was signed with a certificate issued to 'Amy Cherne'. An attempt to exfiltrate data from a software company using Rclone to a Wasabi cloud storage bucket was observed. A different, Python backdoor called Fakeset was found on the networks of a US airport. The Fakeset backdoor was signed by certificates issued to 'Amy Cherne' and 'Donald Gay'. The Donald Gay certificate has been used previously to sign malware linked to MuddyWater. The Donald Gay certificate was also used to sign a sample from the malware family tracked as 'Stagecomp', which downloads the Darkcomp backdoor. The Stagecomp and Darkcomp malware have been linked to MuddyWater by security vendors including Google, Microsoft, and Kaspersky.

Timeline

  1. 06.03.2026 17:15 1 articles · 23h ago

    MuddyWater Targets US Companies with Dindoor and Fakeset Backdoors

    The MuddyWater threat actor has targeted US companies in a new campaign that started in early February 2026. The campaign involves a previously unknown backdoor dubbed 'Dindoor' that leverages Deno for execution and is signed with a certificate issued to 'Amy Cherne'. An attempt to exfiltrate data from a software company using Rclone to a Wasabi cloud storage bucket was observed. A different, Python backdoor called Fakeset was found on the networks of a US airport, signed by certificates issued to 'Amy Cherne' and 'Donald Gay'. The Donald Gay certificate has been used previously to sign malware linked to MuddyWater.

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  2. 23.02.2026 09:25 1 articles · 12d ago

    MuddyWater Launches Operation Olalampo with New Malware Families

    The MuddyWater threat actor has launched a new campaign codenamed Operation Olalampo targeting organizations and individuals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The campaign involves the deployment of new malware families including GhostFetch, HTTP_VIP, CHAR, and GhostBackDoor. GhostFetch is a first-stage downloader that profiles the system, validates mouse movements, checks screen resolution, and fetches and executes secondary payloads directly in memory. GhostBackDoor is a second-stage backdoor delivered by GhostFetch that supports an interactive shell, file read/write, and re-run GhostFetch. HTTP_VIP is a native downloader that conducts system reconnaissance and deploys AnyDesk from the C2 server. CHAR is a Rust backdoor controlled by a Telegram bot (username "stager_51_bot") that executes cmd.exe or PowerShell commands. The PowerShell command executed by CHAR is designed to execute a SOCKS5 reverse proxy or another backdoor named Kalim, upload data stolen from web browsers, and run unknown executables referred to as "sh.exe" and "gshdoc_release_X64_GUI.exe." The MuddyWater threat actor has been observed exploiting recently disclosed vulnerabilities on public-facing servers to obtain initial access.

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  3. 10.01.2026 12:35 2 articles · 1mo ago

    MuddyWater Deploys RustyWater RAT in New Campaign

    The MuddyWater threat actor has launched a new campaign targeting diplomatic, maritime, financial, and telecom entities in the Middle East with a Rust-based implant codenamed RustyWater. The campaign uses icon spoofing and malicious Word documents to deliver Rust-based implants capable of asynchronous C2, anti-analysis, registry persistence, and modular post-compromise capability expansion. The RustyWater implant gathers victim machine information, detects installed security software, sets up persistence by means of a Windows Registry key, and establishes contact with a command-and-control (C2) server (nomercys.it[.]com) to facilitate file operations and command execution. The RustyWater implant is also referred to as Archer RAT and RUSTRIC. The use of RUSTRIC was previously flagged by Seqrite Labs as part of attacks targeting IT, MSPs, human resources, and software development companies in Israel. Historically, MuddyWater has relied on PowerShell and VBS loaders for initial access and post-compromise operations, but the introduction of Rust-based implants represents a notable tooling evolution toward more structured, modular, and low noise RAT capabilities.

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  4. 08.12.2025 08:46 2 articles · 2mo ago

    MuddyWater Deploys UDPGangster Backdoor in Targeted Campaign

    The MuddyWater threat actor has deployed a new backdoor called UDPGangster that uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for command-and-control (C2) purposes. The attack chain involves using spear-phishing tactics to distribute booby-trapped Microsoft Word documents that trigger the execution of a malicious payload once macros are enabled. The phishing messages impersonate the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs and purport to invite recipients to an online seminar titled "Presidential Elections and Results." The VBA script in the dropper file is equipped to conceal any sign of malicious activity by displaying a Hebrew-language decoy image from Israeli telecommunications provider Bezeq about supposed disconnection periods in the first week of November 2025 across various cities in the country. UDPGangster establishes persistence through Windows Registry modifications and boasts of various anti-analysis checks to resist efforts made by security researchers to take it apart. UDPGangster connects to an external server ("157.20.182[.]75") over UDP port 1269 to exfiltrate collected data, run commands using "cmd.exe," transmit files, update C2 server, and drop and execute additional payloads.

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  5. 02.12.2025 15:37 3 articles · 3mo ago

    MuddyWater Targets Israeli Entities with MuddyViper Backdoor

    The MuddyWater threat actor has targeted Israeli entities spanning academia, engineering, local government, manufacturing, technology, transportation, and utilities sectors. The hacking group has delivered a previously undocumented backdoor called MuddyViper. The attacks also singled out one technology company based in Egypt. The attack chains involve spear-phishing and the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in VPN infrastructure to infiltrate networks and deploy legitimate remote management tools. The campaign uses a loader named Fooder that decrypts and executes the C/C++-based MuddyViper backdoor. The MuddyViper backdoor enables the attackers to collect system information, execute files and shell commands, transfer files, and exfiltrate Windows login credentials and browser data. The backdoor supports 20 commands that facilitate covert access and control of infected systems. The campaign uses go-socks5 reverse tunneling proxies and an open-source utility called HackBrowserData to collect browser data from several browsers. The campaign uses VAXOne, a backdoor that impersonates Veeam, AnyDesk, Xerox, and the OneDrive updater service. The campaign uses CE-Notes, a browser-data stealer that attempts to bypass Google Chrome's app-bound encryption by stealing the encryption key stored in the Local State file of Chromium-based browsers. The campaign uses Blub, a C/C++ browser-data stealer that gathers user login data from Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, and Opera. The campaign uses LP-Notes, a credential stealer written in C/C++ that tricks users into entering their system username and password by displaying a fake Windows Security dialog.

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  6. 22.10.2025 18:00 7 articles · 4mo ago

    MuddyWater Phishing Campaign Using Compromised Mailboxes

    The campaign started on August 19, 2025. The threat actor is also known as Static Kitten, Mercury, and Seedworm. The emails contained malicious Word documents with macro code that decoded and wrote the FakeUpdate malware loader to disk. The FakeUpdate malware loader decrypts the Phoenix backdoor, which is an embedded, AES-encrypted payload. The Phoenix backdoor establishes persistence by modifying the Windows Registry entry. The Phoenix backdoor version 4 includes an additional COM-based persistence mechanism and several functional differences. The Phoenix backdoor gathers information about the system to profile the victim. The Phoenix backdoor connects to its command-and-control (C2) via WinHTTP and starts to beacon and poll for commands. The supported commands in Phoenix v4 include Sleep, Upload file, Download file, Start shell, and Update sleep interval time. The custom infostealer attempts to exfiltrate the database from Chrome, Opera, Brave, and Edge browsers, extract credentials, and snatch the master key to decrypt them. The C2 infrastructure included the PDQ utility for software deployment and management, and the Action1 RMM tool. The server and server-side command-and-control (C2) component were taken down on August 24, 2025, likely indicating a new stage of the attack.

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Information Snippets

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