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IndonesianFoods Worm Floods npm with Over 100,000 Fake Packages

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3 unique sources, 3 articles

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A large-scale spam campaign, dubbed IndonesianFoods, has flooded the npm registry with over 100,000 fake packages since early 2024. The campaign uses a worm-like propagation mechanism that requires manual execution via 'node auto.js' or 'publishScript.js' to propagate. The packages reference each other as dependencies, creating a self-replicating network. The goal appears to be monetization through the Tea protocol, rather than traditional malicious activities like data theft. The campaign has been ongoing for nearly two years, highlighting a significant security blind spot in automated detection systems. The malicious script executes in an infinite loop, removing 'private': true in package.json, generating random version numbers, and publishing new spam packages to npm. A single execution can publish approximately 12 packages per minute, 720 per hour, or 17,000 per day. The attackers have inflated their 'impact scores' and claimed Tea token rewards for artificial ecosystem value, with one package README boasting about these earnings. The campaign has overwhelmed multiple security data systems, demonstrating unprecedented scale, and has triggered a massive wave of vulnerability reports.

Timeline

  1. 14.11.2025 00:07 1 articles · 23h ago

    IndonesianFoods worm publishes over 100,000 packages

    The IndonesianFoods worm has published over 100,000 packages, growing exponentially. The campaign does not currently have a malicious payload but poses a significant threat to the software supply chain. The attack has overwhelmed security data systems, with Sonatype’s database seeing 72,000 new advisories in a single day. The campaign is linked to the Tea protocol, with attackers inflating their impact scores to earn tokens. The spam campaign began two years ago, with 43,000 packages added in 2023, TEA monetization implemented in 2024, and the worm-like replication loop introduced in 2025.

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  2. 13.11.2025 06:58 3 articles · 1d ago

    Massive npm Spam Campaign Floods Registry with 46,000 Fake Packages

    A large-scale spam campaign has flooded the npm registry with 46,484 fake packages since early 2024. The campaign, dubbed IndonesianFoods, uses a worm-like propagation mechanism and relies on manual execution to evade detection. The goal appears to be monetization through the Tea protocol, rather than traditional malicious activities like data theft. The campaign has been ongoing for nearly two years, highlighting a significant security blind spot in automated detection systems. The malicious script executes in an infinite loop, removing 'private': true in package.json, generating random version numbers, and publishing new spam packages to npm. A single execution can publish approximately 12 packages per minute, 720 per hour, or 17,000 per day. The attackers have inflated their 'impact scores' and claimed Tea token rewards for artificial ecosystem value, with one package README boasting about these earnings. The worm has since published over 100,000 packages, growing exponentially, and has overwhelmed multiple security data systems, demonstrating unprecedented scale. The campaign is linked to the Tea protocol, with attackers inflating their impact scores to earn tokens. The spam campaign began two years ago, with 43,000 packages added in 2023, TEA monetization implemented in 2024, and the worm-like replication loop introduced in 2025.

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Information Snippets

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