Tsundere Botnet Expands via Game Lures and Ethereum-Based C2 on Windows

A new malware-as-a-service (MaaS) named SantaStealer is being advertised on Telegram and hacker forums. Developed by a Russian-speaking actor, it is a rebranded version of BluelineStealer. The malware steals data from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and other applications, operating in memory to avoid file-based detection. Despite claims of advanced evasion techniques, samples analyzed by Rapid7 reveal poor operational security and incomplete development. SantaStealer uses 14 data-collection modules to exfiltrate information via a hardcoded C2 endpoint. The malware is not yet fully operational, but its planned distribution methods include ClickFix attacks, phishing, pirated software, and malvertising.

A self-spreading malware named SORVEPOTEL targets Brazilian users via WhatsApp. The malware spreads through phishing messages containing malicious ZIP files, primarily affecting Windows systems. The campaign is designed for rapid propagation rather than data theft or ransomware. The malware exploits the trust in WhatsApp to spread across contacts and groups, leading to account bans for excessive spam. The majority of infections are concentrated in Brazil, impacting various sectors including government, public service, and technology. The malware uses a Windows shortcut (LNK) file to execute a PowerShell script, which retrieves the main payload and establishes persistence on the infected system. It also communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server for further instructions. New findings reveal that SORVEPOTEL is linked to a banking malware called Maverick, which targets Brazilian banks and monitors active browser window tabs for URLs matching financial institutions. The malware uses IMAP connections to terra.com[.]br email accounts using hardcoded email credentials to retrieve commands and implements a sophisticated remote control mechanism that allows the adversary to pause, resume, and monitor the WhatsApp propagation in real-time. A newly identified banking Trojan known as Eternidade Stealer has been observed pushing Brazil’s cybercrime ecosystem into a more aggressive phase, with attackers using WhatsApp as both an entry point and a propagation tool. The malware combines a WhatsApp-propagating worm, a Delphi-based stealer, and an MSI dropper to harvest financial data, system details, and contact lists. The campaign leverages a combination of social engineering and WhatsApp hijacking to distribute the trojan, using an obfuscated Visual Basic Script to drop a batch script that delivers two payloads: a Python script for WhatsApp Web-based dissemination and an MSI installer for Eternidade Stealer. The malware harvests a victim's entire contact list, filters out groups, business contacts, and broadcast lists, and sends a malicious attachment to all contacts. The MSI installer drops several payloads, including an AutoIt script that checks if the compromised system is based in Brazil by inspecting the operating system language. The script scans running processes and registry keys to ascertain the presence of installed security products and profiles the machine, sending details to a C2 server. The malware injects the Eternidade Stealer payload into 'svchost.exe' using process hollowing. Eternidade Stealer continuously scans active windows and running processes for strings related to banking portals, payment services, and cryptocurrency exchanges and wallets. The malware uses a terra.com[.]br email address to fetch C2 details, mirroring a tactic recently adopted by Water Saci. The campaign's backend was traced to two panels, one for managing the Redirector System and another login panel, used to monitor infected hosts. The threat actor Water Saci is using a sophisticated, highly layered infection chain that uses HTML Application (HTA) files and PDFs to propagate a worm that deploys a banking trojan via WhatsApp in attacks targeting users in Brazil. The latest wave is characterized by the attackers shifting from PowerShell to a Python-based variant that spreads the malware in a worm-like manner over WhatsApp Web. The PDF lure instructs victims to update Adobe Reader by clicking on an embedded link. Users who receive HTA files are deceived into executing a Visual Basic Script immediately upon opening, which then runs PowerShell commands to fetch next-stage payloads from a remote server, an MSI installer for the trojan and a Python script that's responsible for spreading the malware via WhatsApp Web. The MSI installer serves as a conduit for delivering the banking trojan using an AutoIt script. The script also runs checks to ensure that only one instance of the trojan is running at any given point of time. The script verifies the presence of a marker file named "executed.dat." If it does not exist, the script creates the file and notifies an attacker-controlled server ("manoelimoveiscaioba[.]com"). The script analyzes the user's Google Chrome browsing history to search visits to banking websites, specifically a hard-coded list comprising Santander, Banco do Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, Sicredi, and Bradesco. The script then proceeds to another critical reconnaissance step that involves checking for installed antivirus and security software, as well as harvesting detailed system metadata. The main functionality of the malware is to monitor open windows and extract their window titles to compare them against a list of banks, payment platforms, exchanges, and cryptocurrency wallets. If any of these windows contain keywords related to targeted entities, the script looks for a TDA file dropped by the installer and decrypts and injects it into a hollowed "svchost.exe" process, following which the loader searches for an additional DMP file containing the banking trojan. The banking trojan deployed is not Maverick, but rather a malware that exhibits structural and behavioral continuity with Casbaneiro. The trojan carries out "aggressive" anti-virtualization checks to sidestep analysis and detection, and gathers host information through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries. The trojan makes Registry modifications to set up persistence and establishes contact with a C2 server ("serverseistemasatu[.]com") to send the collected details and receive backdoor commands that grant remote control over the infected system. The trojan forcibly terminates several browsers to force victims to reopen banking sites under "attacker-controlled conditions." The second aspect of the campaign is the use of a Python script, an enhanced version of its PowerShell predecessor, to enable malware delivery to every contact via WhatsApp Web sessions using the Selenium browser automation tool. There is "compelling" evidence to suggest that Water Saci may have used a large language model (LLMs) or code-translation tool to port their propagation script from PowerShell to Python, given the functional similarities between the two versions and the inclusion of emojis in console outputs. The development comes as Brazilian banking users are also being targeted by a previously undocumented Android malware dubbed RelayNFC that's designed to carry out Near-Field Communication (NFC) relay attacks and siphon contactless payment data. RelayNFC implements a full real-time APDU relay channel, allowing attackers to complete transactions as though the victim's card were physically present. The malware is built using React Native and Hermes bytecode, which complicates static analysis and helps evade detection. Primarily spread via phishing, the attack makes use of decoy Portuguese-language sites (e.g., "maisseguraca[.]site") to trick users into installing the malware under the pretext of securing their payment cards. The end goal of the campaign is to capture the victim's card details and relay them to attackers, who can then perform fraudulent transactions using the stolen data. The cybersecurity company said its investigation also uncovered a separate phishing site ("test.ikotech[.]online") that distributes an APK file with a partial implementation of Host Card Emulation (HCE), indicating that the threat actors are experimenting with different NFC relay techniques.

The COLDRIVER APT group, also known as Star Blizzard, has intensified its operations since May 2025, rapidly developing and refining its malware arsenal. The group has launched a new campaign using ClickFix tactics to deliver three new malware families: NOROBOT, YESROBOT, and MAYBEROBOT. These malware families are connected via a delivery chain and target individuals and organizations connected to Russia, including NGOs, human rights defenders, and think tanks. The attack chain involves tricking victims into running a malicious DLL via a fake CAPTCHA check, leading to the deployment of the SIMPLEFIX backdoor. The malware exfiltrates specific file types and establishes communication with a command-and-control server. The campaign aligns with COLDRIVER's known victimology, focusing on civil society members connected to Russia. The group has been active since 2019, using spear-phishing and custom tools like SPICA and LOSTKEYS. The latest campaign demonstrates the group's continued use of effective infection vectors, despite their lack of technical sophistication. The malware families NOROBOT and MAYBEROBOT are tracked by Zscaler ThreatLabz under the names BAITSWITCH and SIMPLEFIX, respectively. The COLDRIVER group has been deploying the new malware set more aggressively than any previous campaigns. The new malware set replaces the previous primary malware LOSTKEYS, which has not been observed since its public disclosure in May 2025. The attack starts with a 'ClickFix-style' phishing lure, a fake CAPTCHA page designed to trick the victim into thinking they must verify they’re 'not a robot'. The malware uses a split-key cryptography scheme, with parts of the decryption key hidden in downloaded files and the Windows Registry. The malware fetches a self-extracting Python 3.8 installer, two encrypted Python scripts, and a scheduled task to ensure persistence. The Python scripts are combined to decrypt and launch a minimal Python-based first-stage backdoor that communicates with a hardcoded command-and-control (C2) server. The COLDRIVER group abandoned YESROBOT after just two weeks due to its cumbersome and easily detectable nature. The COLDRIVER group switched to MAYBEROBOT, a more flexible PowerShell-based backdoor, around June 2025. MAYBEROBOT uses a custom C2 protocol with commands to download and execute files, run commands via cmd.exe, and execute PowerShell blocks. The COLDRIVER group has been constantly evolving the NOROBOT malware to evade detection systems. The group has been using the NOROBOT and MAYBEROBOT malware families on targets previously compromised through phishing to acquire additional intelligence value from information on their devices directly. The PhantomCaptcha campaign targeted Ukrainian regional government administration and organizations critical for the war relief effort, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and various NGOs. The campaign began on October 8, 2025, and used a malicious "I am not a robot" CAPTCHA challenge to execute a PowerShell command, installing malware on victims' systems. The malware operated in three stages: a downloader script, a reconnaissance module, and a WebSocket-based RAT. The campaign's infrastructure was active for just one day, with backend servers remaining online to manage infected devices. The PhantomCaptcha campaign is linked to a wider operation involving malicious Android apps disguised as adult entertainment or cloud storage services. The latest incidents were reported in May and June 2025 by two organizations, including Reporters Without Borders (RSF). The group is known for impersonating trusted contacts and prompting targets to request missing or malfunctioning attachments. In one case involving RSF in March 2025, a ProtonMail address mimicking a legitimate contact sent a French-language email asking a core member to review a document. No file was attached. When the member requested it, the operators replied in English with a link routed through a compromised website to a ProtonDrive URL. However, the file itself could not be retrieved because ProtonMail had blocked the associated account. A second victim received a file labeled as a PDF that was actually a ZIP archive disguised with a .pdf extension. The final stage of the attack used a typical Calisto decoy PDF that claimed to be encrypted and instructed the user to open it in ProtonDrive. The link again sent the target through a redirector hosted on a compromised website. The phishing kit analyzed by TDR, located on account.simpleasip[.]org, appeared to be custom built. It targeted ProtonMail accounts using an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) setup that relays two-factor authentication (2FA). Analysts found injected JavaScript designed to keep the cursor locked to the password field and to interact with an attacker-controlled API for handling CAPTCHA and 2FA prompts. Star Blizzard's infrastructure included servers hosting phishing pages and others serving as API endpoints. Many domains were tied to Namecheap services, while some earlier ones were registered via Regway to help analysts track the cluster over time.

A rapidly spreading phishing campaign is targeting Windows users and Booking.com partner accounts worldwide, stealing credentials and deploying various remote access trojans (RATs) using malicious JavaScript files and PowerShell commands. The campaign affects multiple sectors, including manufacturing, technology, healthcare, construction, retail/hospitality, and the hospitality industry. The attackers use personalized phishing pages and socially engineered scenarios to lure victims into downloading the malware. The campaign involves multiple stages, including an initial obfuscated script, a spoofed site, and the deployment of RATs such as PureHVNC, DCRat, and Babylon RAT. The attackers employ sophisticated techniques to evade detection and maintain long-term access to compromised networks. The campaign has been observed in countries including Austria, Belarus, Canada, Egypt, India, and Pakistan. The phishing emails use themes related to voicemail messages, purchases, and banking verification issues to deceive recipients into clicking on malicious links. The initial payload is a ZIP archive containing an obfuscated JavaScript file that acts as a dropper for UpCrypter, which functions as a conduit for various RATs. The malware uses steganography to embed the final payload within a harmless-looking image and includes anti-analysis and anti-virtual machine checks to evade detection. The malware is executed without writing to the file system, minimizing forensic traces. The campaign is part of a larger trend where threat actors abuse legitimate services for phishing attacks. A new campaign impersonates Ukrainian government agencies to deliver CountLoader, which drops Amatera Stealer and PureMiner. The phishing emails contain malicious SVG files designed to trick recipients into opening harmful attachments. The SVG files initiate the download of a password-protected ZIP archive containing a CHM file, which activates CountLoader. CountLoader drops various payloads, including Cobalt Strike, AdaptixC2, and PureHVNC RAT, and in this case, Amatera Stealer and PureMiner. Amatera Stealer gathers system information, collects files, and harvests data from various applications and browsers. A Vietnamese-speaking threat group uses phishing emails with copyright infringement notice themes to deploy PXA Stealer, which evolves into PureRAT. PureRAT is a modular, professionally developed backdoor that gives attackers complete control over a compromised host. The campaign demonstrates a progression from simple phishing lures to multi-layered infection sequences involving defense evasion and credential theft. The attack chain begins with a ZIP archive containing a legitimate PDF reader executable and a malicious DLL, using DLL sideloading to execute the next payload. The malware employs multiple stages of obfuscation, including Base64 encoding, steganography, and anti-analysis techniques to evade detection. The campaign uses a combination of Python scripts and .NET executables to achieve its objectives, demonstrating a progression from simple phishing lures to multi-layered infection sequences. The final payload, PureRAT, is a modular, professionally developed backdoor that provides complete control over a compromised host. The threat actor uses Telegram bot descriptions and URL shorteners to dynamically fetch and execute the next payload, allowing for flexible updates to the attack chain. The malware includes defense evasion techniques such as AMSI patching and ETW unhooking to avoid detection by security tools. The campaign is attributed to a Vietnamese-speaking threat group associated with the PXA Stealer malware family, using infrastructure traced to Vietnam. The threat actor demonstrates proficiency in multiple languages and techniques, including Python bytecode loaders, WMI enumeration, .NET process hollowing, and reflective DLL loading. The pivot from a custom-coded stealer to a commercial RAT like PureRAT lowers the barrier to entry for the attacker, providing access to a stable, feature-rich toolkit. A large-scale phishing operation has been targeting Booking.com partner accounts since at least April 2025. The campaign exploits hotel systems and customer data, using a sophisticated malware campaign. The intrusion begins with malicious emails sent from legitimate hotel accounts or impersonating Booking.com, leading victims to execute a PowerShell command that downloads PureRAT. PureRAT allows attackers to remotely control infected machines, steal credentials, capture screenshots, and exfiltrate sensitive data. The malware initially targets hotel staff to steal login credentials for booking platforms, which are then used in fraudulent schemes. The campaign demonstrates the growing professionalization of cybercrime targeting the hospitality industry, with hundreds of malicious domains active as of October 2025. The firm continues to monitor adversary infrastructure and improve detection methods to help protect booking platforms and their customers. Researchers have uncovered a broad campaign in which threat actors target hotels with ClickFix attacks to steal customer data as part of ongoing attacks against the hospitality sector that includes secondary attacks against the establishments' customers. The initial attack against hotels uses a compromised email account to send malicious messages to multiple hotel establishments. In some instances, attackers alter the "From" header to impersonate Booking.com, while subject lines are often related to guest matters, including references to last-minute booking, listings, reservations, and the like. The attack chain then uses a redirection URL that ultimately leads to a ClickFix reCAPTACHA challenge in which users are prompted to copy a malicious PowerShell command. This command eventually leads to the deployment of infostealing and remote access Trojan (RAT) malware. The campaign has led to secondary attacks against hotel customers, with attackers contacting them via WhatsApp or email using legitimate reservation details of the target. Attackers then ask victims to validate banking details by visiting a URL, which leads to the phishing page that mimics Booking.com’s typography and layout and which harvests the victim’s banking information. A Russian-speaking threat behind an ongoing, mass phishing campaign has registered more than 4,300 domain names since the start of the year. The activity, per Netcraft security researcher Andrew Brandt, is designed to target customers of the hospitality industry, specifically hotel guests who may have travel reservations with spam emails. The campaign is said to have begun in earnest around February 2025. Of the 4,344 domains tied to the attack, 685 domains contain the name "Booking", followed by 18 with "Expedia," 13 with "Agoda," and 12 with "Airbnb," indicating an attempt to target all popular booking and rental platforms. The ongoing campaign employs a sophisticated phishing kit that customizes the page presented to the site visitor depending on a unique string in the URL path when the target first visits the website. The customizations use the logos from major online travel industry brands, including Airbnb and Booking.com. The attack begins with a phishing email urging recipients to click on a link to confirm their booking within the next 24 hours using a credit card. Should they take the bait, the victims are taken to a fake site instead after initiating a chain of redirects. These bogus sites follow consistent naming patterns for their domains, featuring phrases like confirmation, booking, guestcheck, cardverify, or reservation to give them an illusion of legitimacy. The pages support 43 different languages, allowing the threat actors to cast a wide net. The page then instructs the victim to pay a deposit for their hotel reservation by entering their card information. In the event that any user directly attempts to access the page without a unique identifier called AD_CODE, they are greeted with a blank page. The bogus sites also feature a fake CAPTCHA check that mimics Cloudflare to deceive the target. The ongoing campaign employs a sophisticated phishing kit that customizes the page presented to the site visitor depending on a unique string in the URL path when the target first visits the website. The customizations use the logos from major online travel industry brands, including Airbnb and Booking.com. The attack begins with a phishing email urging recipients to click on a link to confirm their booking within the next 24 hours using a credit card. Should they take the bait, the victims are taken to a fake site instead after initiating a chain of redirects. These bogus sites follow consistent naming patterns for their domains, featuring phrases like confirmation, booking, guestcheck, cardverify, or reservation to give them an illusion of legitimacy. The pages support 43 different languages, allowing the threat actors to cast a wide net. The page then instructs the victim to pay a deposit for their hotel reservation by entering their card information. In the event that any user directly attempts to access the page without a unique identifier called AD_CODE, they are greeted with a blank page. The bogus sites also feature a fake CAPTCHA check that mimics Cloudflare to deceive the target. The campaign uses a unique identifier called AD_CODE to ensure consistent branding across pages. The phishing pages attempt to process a transaction in the background while displaying a support chat window for 3D Secure verification. The identity of the threat group remains unknown, but Russian is used in source code comments and debugger output. The campaign is linked to a previous phishing campaign targeting the hospitality industry with PureRAT malware. The phishing kit is a fully automated, multi-stage platform designed for efficiency and stealth. The phishing kit employs CAPTCHA filtering to evade security scans and uses Telegram bots to exfiltrate stolen credentials and payment information. The ongoing trojan malware campaign designed to take control of systems and steal sensitive information is being generated with the aid of AI. PureRAT is a full-featured remote access trojan (RAT) and infostealer which first emerged last year. It has recently been spotted being distributed via malicious links in phishing emails which pose as job opportunities. Analysis by Symantec and Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team has concluded that the cybercriminals behind PureRAT are using AI tools to write scripts and code. One of the reasons for this conclusion is that sections of the code powering PureRAT contain emojis. Many AIs have a tendency to insert emojis in code comments because they’ve been trained using data from social platforms such as Reddit. In addition, sections of the code appear to contain explanatory comments, debug messages and reminders. For example, one section of the code contains the line “Remember to paste the base64-encoded HVNC shellcode here”. It’s likely that these are instructions by an AI tool which those behind PureRAT have failed to remove from the scripts. Aside from Emojis, detailed comments on nearly every line of the script are usually a giveaway that it was authored by AI. While we do see attackers occasionally leaving notes for themselves, we'd hardly ever see something like a full sentence. Nonetheless, despite the leftover AI-generated instructions, PureRAT is a potent, widely distributed malware threat. The malware provides cybercriminals with the ability to stealthy maintain a remote presence on an infected machine, which the attackers can use to either steal data for themselves or sell access to compromised machines to others. The attacker may be casting their net for jobseekers in multiple countries in the hope that they open the emails on their work computer. The attacker’s usage of AI provides further evidence that the technology is being used by lower-skilled attackers to assist with developing tools and automating their attacks. According to Symantec and Carbon Black, there is evidence that the attacker behind PureRAT is based in Vietnam. This conclusion has been reached because of the use of the Vietnamese language throughout the scripts, both in the code and in the comments left by AI tools. There are also references to Hanoi, the Vietnamese capital.

The ClickFix malware campaign has evolved to include multi-OS support and video tutorials that guide victims through the self-infection process. The campaign, which uses fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages and malicious PowerShell scripts, has been observed deploying various payloads, including information stealers and backdoors. The FileFix attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, impersonates Meta account suspension warnings to trick users into installing the StealC infostealer malware. The campaign has evolved over two weeks with different payloads, domains, and lures, indicating an attacker testing and adapting their infrastructure. The FileFix technique, created by red team researcher mr. d0x, uses the address bar in File Explorer to execute malicious commands. The campaign employs steganography to hide a second-stage PowerShell script and encrypted executables inside a JPG image, which is believed to be AI-generated. The StealC malware targets credentials from various applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and cloud services, and can take screenshots of the active desktop. The FileFix attack uses a multilingual phishing site to trick users into executing a malicious command via the File Explorer address bar. The attack leverages Bitbucket to host the malicious components, abusing a legitimate source code hosting platform to bypass detection. The attack involves a multi-stage PowerShell script that downloads an image, decodes it into the next-stage payload, and runs a Go-based loader to launch StealC. The attack uses advanced obfuscation techniques, including junk code and fragmentation, to hinder analysis efforts. The FileFix attack is more likely to be detected by security products due to the payload being executed by the web browser used by the victim. The FileFix attack demonstrates significant investment in tradecraft, with carefully engineered phishing infrastructure, payload delivery, and supporting elements to maximize evasion and impact. The FileFix attack is more sophisticated than ClickFix, as it abuses a widely used browser feature instead of the Run dialog or Terminal app. The FileFix attack has been observed in a campaign that uses a combination of fake support portals, Cloudflare CAPTCHA error pages, and clipboard hijacking to socially engineer victims into running malicious PowerShell code. The FileFix attack has been observed using an AutoHotkey (AHK) script to profile the compromised host and deliver additional payloads, including AnyDesk, TeamViewer, information stealers, and clipper malware. The FileFix attack has been observed using an MSHTA command pointing to a lookalike Google domain to retrieve and execute a remote malicious script. The MetaStealer attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, uses a fake Cloudflare Turnstile lure and an MSI package disguised as a PDF to deploy the MetaStealer infostealer malware. The attack involves a multi-stage infection chain that includes a DLL sideloading technique using a legitimate SentinelOne executable. The MetaStealer attack targets crypto wallets and other sensitive information, using a combination of social engineering and technical evasion techniques to deploy malware. Recently, threat actors have been abusing the decades-old Finger protocol to retrieve and execute remote commands on Windows devices. The Finger protocol is used to deliver commands that create a random-named path, download a zip archive disguised as a PDF, and extract a Python malware package. The Python program is executed using pythonw.exe __init__.py, and a callback is made to the attacker's server to confirm execution. A related batch file indicates that the Python package is an infostealer. Another campaign uses the Finger protocol to retrieve and run commands that look for malware research tools and exit if found. If no malware analysis tools are found, the commands download a zip archive disguised as PDF files and extract the NetSupport Manager RAT package. The commands configure a scheduled task to launch the remote access malware when the user logs in. The Finger protocol abuse appears to be carried out by a single threat actor conducting ClickFix attacks. A new EVALUSION ClickFix campaign has been discovered, delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT. Amatera Stealer, an evolution of ACR Stealer, is available under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model and targets crypto-wallets, browsers, messaging applications, FTP clients, and email services. It employs advanced evasion techniques such as WoW64 SysCalls and is packed using PureCrypter. The stealer is injected into the MSBuild.exe process to harvest sensitive data and contact an external server to execute a PowerShell command to fetch and run NetSupport RAT. The campaign also involves phishing attacks using various malware families and phishing kits named Cephas and Tycoon 2FA. Tycoon 2FA is a phishing kit that bypasses multi-factor authentication (MFA) and authentication apps by intercepting usernames, passwords, session cookies, and MFA flows in real-time. It has been used in over 64,000 attacks this year, primarily targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Tycoon 2FA includes anti-detection layers and can lead to total session takeover, allowing attackers to move laterally into various enterprise systems. Legacy MFA methods are vulnerable to Tycoon 2FA, and phishing-proof MFA solutions like Token Ring and Token BioStick are recommended to prevent such attacks. A new operation embedding StealC V2 inside Blender project files has been observed targeting victims for at least six months. The attackers placed manipulated .blend files on platforms such as CGTrader, where users downloaded them as routine 3D assets. When opened with Blender’s Auto Run feature enabled, the files executed concealed Python scripts that launched a multistage infection. The infection chain began with a tampered Rig_Ui.py script embedded inside the .blend file. This script fetched a loader from a remote workers.dev domain, which then downloaded a PowerShell stage and two ZIP archives containing Python-based stealers. Once extracted into the Windows temp directory, the malware created LNK files to secure persistence, then used Pyramid C2 channels to retrieve encrypted payloads. StealC V2, promoted on underground forums since April 2025, has rapidly expanded its feature set. It now targets more than 23 browsers, over 100 plugins, more than 15 desktop wallets, and a range of messaging, VPN and mail clients. Its pricing, from $200 per month to $800 for 6 months, has made it accessible to low-tier cybercriminals seeking ready-to-use tools. ClickFix attack variants have been observed using a realistic-looking Windows Update animation in a full-screen browser page to trick users into executing malicious commands. The new ClickFix variants drop the LummaC2 and Rhadamanthys information stealers. The attack uses steganography to encode the final malware payload inside an image. The process involves multiple stages that use PowerShell code and a .NET assembly (the Stego Loader) responsible for reconstructing the final payload embedded inside a PNG file in an encrypted state. The shellcode holding the infostealer samples is packed using the Donut tool. The Rhadamanthys variant that used the Windows Update lure was first spotted by researchers back in October, before Operation Endgame took down parts of its infrastructure on November 13. A new campaign codenamed JackFix leverages fake adult websites (xHamster, PornHub clones) as its phishing mechanism, likely distributed via malvertising. The JackFix campaign displays highly convincing fake Windows update screens in an attempt to get the victim to run malicious code. The attack heavily leans on obfuscation to conceal ClickFix-related code and blocks users from escaping the full-screen alert by disabling the Escape and F11 buttons, along with F5 and F12 keys. The initial command executed is an MSHTA payload that's launched using the legitimate mshta.exe binary, which contains JavaScript designed to run a PowerShell command to retrieve another PowerShell script from a remote server. The PowerShell script attempts to elevate privileges and creates Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions for command-and-control (C2) addresses and paths where the payloads are staged. The PowerShell script serves up to eight different payloads, including Rhadamanthys Stealer, Vidar Stealer 2.0, RedLine Stealer, Amadey, and other unspecified loaders and RATs. The threat actor often changes the URI used to host the first mshta.exe stage and has been observed moving from hosting the second stage on the domain securitysettings.live to xoiiasdpsdoasdpojas.com, although both point to the same IP address 141.98.80.175. An initial access broker tracked as Storm-0249 is abusing endpoint detection and response solutions and trusted Microsoft Windows utilities to load malware, establish communication, and persistence in preparation for ransomware attacks. The threat actor has moved beyond mass phishing and adopted stealthier, more advanced methods that prove effective and difficult for defenders to counter. In one attack analyzed by researchers at cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, Storm-0249 leveraged the SentinelOne EDR components to hide malicious activity. The attack started with ClickFix social engineering that tricked users into pasting and executing curl commands in the Windows Run dialog to download a malicious MSI package with SYSTEM privileges. A malicious PowerShell script is also fetched from a spoofed Microsoft domain, which is piped straight onto the system's memory, never touching the disk and thus evading antivirus detection. The MSI file drops a malicious DLL (SentinelAgentCore.dll), which is placed strategically alongside the pre-existing, legitimate SentinelAgentWorker.exe, which is already installed as part of the victim's SentinelOne EDR. Next, the attacker loads the DLL using the signed SentinelAgentWorker (DLL sideloading), executing the file within the trusted, privileged EDR process and obtaining stealthy persistence that survives operating system updates. Once the attacker gains access, they use the SentinelOne component to collect system identifiers through legitimate Windows utilities like reg.exe and findstr.exe, and to funnel encrypted HTTPS command-and-control (C2) traffic. The compromised systems are profiled using 'MachineGuid,' a unique hardware-based identifier that ransomware groups like LockBit and ALPHV use for binding encryption keys to specific victims. The abuse of trusted, signed EDR processes bypasses nearly all traditional monitoring. The researchers recommend that system administrators rely on behavior-based detection that identifies trusted processes loading unsigned DLLs from non-standard paths. Furthermore, it is helpful to set stricter controls for curl, PowerShell, and LoLBin execution. A new variation of the ClickFix attack dubbed 'ConsentFix' abuses the Azure CLI OAuth app to hijack Microsoft accounts without the need for a password or to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) verifications. ConsentFix tricks victims into completing the Azure CLI OAuth flow and steals the resulting authorization code, which is exchanged for full account access. The attack starts with victims landing on a compromised, legitimate website that ranks high on Google Search results. Victims are shown a fake Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA widget that asks for a valid business email address, filtering out bots and non-targets. Victims are instructed to click a 'Sign in' button that opens a legitimate Microsoft URL in a new tab, leading to an Azure login page. The attack completes when victims paste the URL containing the Azure CLI OAuth authorization code into the malicious page, granting attackers access to the Microsoft account via Azure CLI. The attack triggers only once per victim IP address, preventing repeated phishing attempts on the same IP. Defenders are advised to monitor for unusual Azure CLI login activity, such as logins from new IP addresses, and to check for legacy Graph scopes used by attackers to evade detection. Over the past six months, hackers have increasingly relied on the browser-in-the-browser (BitB) method to trick users into providing Facebook account credentials. The BitB phishing technique was developed by security researcher mr.d0x in 2022. In a BitB attack, users who visit attacker-controlled webpages are presented with a fake browser pop-up containing a login form. The pop-up is implemented using an iframe that imitates the authentication interface of legitimate platforms and can be customized with a window title and URL that make the deception more difficult to detect. Recent phishing campaigns targeting Facebook users impersonate law firms claiming copyright infringement, threatening imminent account suspension, or Meta security notifications about unauthorized logins. To avoid detection and to increase the sense of legitimacy, cybercriminals added shortened URLs and fake Meta CAPTCHA pages. In the final stage of the attack, victims are prompted to log in by entering their Facebook credentials in a fake pop-up window. Trellix discovered a high number of phishing pages hosted on legitimate cloud platforms like Netlify and Vercel, which mimic Meta's Privacy Center portal, redirecting users to pages disguised as appeal forms that collected personal information. These campaigns constitute a significant evolution compared to standard Facebook phishing campaigns that security researchers typically observe. The key shift lies in the abuse of trusted infrastructure, utilizing legitimate cloud hosting services like Netlify and Vercel, and URL shorteners to bypass traditional security filters and lend a false sense of security to phishing pages. Most critically, the emergence of the Browser-in-the-Browser (BitB) technique represents a major escalation. By creating a custom-built, fake login pop-up window within the victim's browser, this method capitalizes on user familiarity with authentication flows, making credential theft nearly impossible to detect visually. A new campaign codenamed CrashFix uses a malicious Chrome extension to deliver ModeloRAT via ClickFix-style browser crash lures. The campaign, tracked as KongTuke, uses a malicious Chrome extension named 'NexShield – Advanced Web Guardian' to crash the browser and trick victims into executing commands. The extension masquerades as a legitimate ad blocker and claims to protect users against ads, trackers, malware, and intrusive content. The extension was downloaded at least 5,000 times and is a near-identical clone of uBlock Origin Lite. The extension displays a fake security warning claiming the browser had 'stopped abnormally' and prompts users to run a 'scan'. The scan presents a bogus security alert instructing victims to open the Windows Run dialog and execute a command copied to the clipboard. Executing the command causes the browser to freeze and crash by launching a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that creates new runtime port connections through an infinite loop. The extension transmits a unique ID to an attacker-controlled server, allowing operators to track victims. The extension uses a delayed execution mechanism, triggering malicious behavior 60 minutes after installation and then every 10 minutes. The extension incorporates anti-analysis techniques to disable right-click context menus and prevent the use of developer tools. The CrashFix command employs the legitimate Windows utility, finger.exe, to retrieve and execute the next-stage payload from the attacker's server. The payload is a PowerShell command that retrieves a secondary PowerShell script, which uses multiple layers of Base64 encoding and XOR operations to conceal the next-stage malware. The decrypted blob scans running processes for over 50 analysis tools and virtual machine indicators, ceasing execution if found. The script checks if the machine is domain-joined or standalone and sends an HTTP POST request to the server containing a list of installed antivirus products and a flag indicating the machine type. For domain-joined machines, the campaign deploys ModeloRAT, a fully-featured Python-based Windows RAT that uses RC4 encryption for C2 communications. ModeloRAT sets up persistence using Registry and facilitates the execution of binaries, DLLs, Python scripts, and PowerShell commands. ModeloRAT is equipped to update or terminate itself upon receiving specific commands and implements varied beaconing logic to avoid detection. For standalone workstations, the campaign ends with the C2 server responding with a test payload message, indicating it may still be in the testing phase. KongTuke's CrashFix campaign demonstrates how threat actors evolve their social engineering tactics by impersonating trusted projects and exploiting user frustration. Huntress attributes the analyzed CrashFix attack to a threat actor named 'KongTuke', whose operations have been on the company's radar since early 2025. Based on the recent discovery, the researchers believe that KongTuke is evolving and becoming more interested in enterprise networks, which are more lucrative for cybercriminals. Falling for ClickFix attacks can be prevented by making sure that the effect of any external command executed on the system is well understood. Furthermore, installing browser extensions from trusted publishers or sources should keep you safe from CrashFix attacks or other threats. Users who installed NexShield should perform a full system cleanup, as uninstalling the extension does not remove all payloads, such as ModeloRAT or other malicious scripts. The new campaign abuses SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs, a signed Visual Basic Script associated with App-V, to retrieve and execute an in-memory loader from an external server using wscript.exe. The campaign uses a fake CAPTCHA verification prompt to trick users into pasting and executing a malicious command on the Windows Run dialog. The obfuscated loader runs checks to ensure that it's not run within sandboxed environments. The loader fetches configuration data from a public Google Calendar (ICS) file, turning a trusted third-party service into a dead drop resolver. The campaign retrieves additional loader stages, including a PowerShell script that functions as an intermediate loader to execute the next stage directly in memory. The resulting script is decrypted, GZip decompressed in memory, and run using Invoke-Expression, ultimately culminating in the execution of a shellcode loader designed to launch Amatera Stealer. The campaign targets enterprise managed systems, as the virtualization solution is built only into Enterprise and Education editions of Windows 10 and Windows 11, along with modern Windows Server versions. The campaign is highly sophisticated and evasive, using in-memory PowerShell code execution and relying on blockchain and popular CDNs to avoid communicating with any infrastructure that's not a legitimate service. The campaign uses a multi-stage attack chain that includes a fake CAPTCHA verification prompt, abuse of SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs, and retrieval of configuration data from a public Google Calendar file. The campaign is part of the broader fake CAPTCHA ecosystem, which uses trusted web infrastructure as the delivery surface, with Cloudflare-style challenges acting as a conduit for clipboard-driven execution of PowerShell commands, VB Scripts, MSI installers, and browser-native frameworks like Matrix Push C2.