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INC Ransom Gang Disrupts OnSolve CodeRED Emergency Alert Platform

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2 unique sources, 3 articles

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The INC Ransom gang has disrupted the OnSolve CodeRED emergency alert platform, stealing sensitive user data and forcing Crisis24 to decommission the legacy environment. The attack affected emergency notification systems used by state and local governments, police departments, and fire agencies across the United States. Data stolen includes names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and passwords. The gang claims to have breached the system on November 1, 2025, and encrypted files on November 10, 2025. Crisis24 is rebuilding the service using backups from March 31, 2025, which may result in missing accounts. The incident highlights the critical impact of cyberattacks on emergency services and the importance of robust cybersecurity measures. The INC Ransom group has published screenshots of stolen data and is selling samples of the stolen data, escalating concerns among affected agencies. An operational security failure by the INC ransomware gang allowed researchers to recover data stolen from a dozen U.S. organizations. The investigation, conducted by Cyber Centaurs, revealed artifacts from the legitimate backup tool Restic, which exposed attacker infrastructure. The researchers developed a controlled enumeration process that confirmed the presence of encrypted data stolen from 12 unrelated organizations.

Timeline

  1. 22.01.2026 18:21 1 articles · 23h ago

    INC Ransomware Opsec Fail Allows Data Recovery for 12 US Orgs

    An operational security failure by the INC ransomware gang allowed researchers to recover data stolen from a dozen U.S. organizations. The investigation, conducted by Cyber Centaurs, revealed artifacts from the legitimate backup tool Restic, which exposed attacker infrastructure. The researchers developed a controlled enumeration process that confirmed the presence of encrypted data stolen from 12 unrelated organizations. The researchers decrypted the backups and preserved the copies while contacting law enforcement.

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  2. 25.11.2025 23:48 3 articles · 1mo ago

    INC Ransom Gang Disrupts OnSolve CodeRED Emergency Alert Platform

    The INC Ransom gang has disrupted the OnSolve CodeRED emergency alert platform, stealing sensitive user data and forcing Crisis24 to decommission the legacy environment. The attack affected emergency notification systems used by state and local governments, police departments, and fire agencies across the United States. Data stolen includes names, addresses, email addresses, phone numbers, and passwords. The gang claims to have breached the system on November 1, 2025, and encrypted files on November 10, 2025. Crisis24 is rebuilding the service using backups from March 31, 2025, which may result in missing accounts. The INC Ransom group has published screenshots of stolen data and is selling samples of the stolen data, escalating concerns among affected agencies.

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Information Snippets

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