GhostPoster Campaign Uses Steganography in Firefox Addon Logos

The ShadyPanda campaign has amassed over 4.3 million installations of malicious Chrome and Edge browser extensions, evolving from legitimate tools into spyware over multiple phases. The extensions, discovered by Koi Security, engaged in affiliate fraud, search hijacking, and remote code execution. The campaign remains active on the Microsoft Edge Add-ons platform, with one extension having 3 million installs. The extensions collect browsing history, search queries, keystrokes, mouse clicks, and other sensitive data, exfiltrating it to domains in China. Users are advised to remove these extensions and reset their account passwords. The ShadyPanda campaign used a supply-chain attack tactic by publishing or acquiring harmless extensions, letting them run clean for years to build trust and gain millions of installs, then suddenly flipping them into malware via silent updates. The compromised extensions became a fully fledged remote code execution (RCE) framework inside the browser, capable of downloading and running arbitrary JavaScript with full access to the browser's data and capabilities. The extensions could steal session cookies and tokens, allowing them to impersonate entire SaaS accounts such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace. The risk of malicious browser extensions extends beyond individual users, as they can access cookies, local storage, cloud auth sessions, active web content, and file downloads, blurring the line between endpoint security and cloud security. Organizations should enforce extension allow lists, treat extension access like OAuth access, audit extension permissions regularly, and monitor for suspicious extension behavior to reduce the risk of malicious extensions. Modern SaaS security platforms, such as Reco's Dynamic SaaS Security platform, can help organizations monitor and detect suspicious activity related to browser extensions in real time.

A fake Chrome extension named 'Safery: Ethereum Wallet' steals users' Ethereum wallet seed phrases by encoding them into Sui addresses and broadcasting microtransactions from a threat actor-controlled Sui wallet. The extension was uploaded to the Chrome Web Store on September 29, 2025, and remains available as of November 13, 2025. The malware avoids traditional command-and-control (C2) servers by embedding seed phrases in blockchain transactions, allowing the attacker to decode and reconstruct the original seed phrases to drain victims' funds. The extension was updated as recently as November 12, 2025, and is still available for download. Users are advised to stick to trusted wallet extensions and scan for mnemonic encoders, synthetic address generators, and hard-coded seed phrases.

A sophisticated ad fraud operation, SlopAds, exploited 224 Android apps to generate 2.3 billion daily ad bids. The apps, downloaded 38 million times across 228 countries, used steganography and hidden WebViews to create fraudulent ad impressions and clicks. The fraud was conditional, activating only if the app was installed via an ad click. Google removed the offending apps from the Play Store and updated Google Play Protect to warn users. The operation leveraged AI-themed services and a complex command-and-control infrastructure. The fraudulent behavior was designed to evade detection by blending malicious traffic into legitimate campaign data. The SlopAds campaign was discovered by HUMAN's Satori Threat Intelligence team, which identified the apps as 'AI slop' due to their mass-produced appearance and AI-themed services. The apps used Firebase Remote Config to download an encrypted configuration file containing URLs for the ad fraud malware module, cashout servers, and a JavaScript payload. The campaign included numerous command-and-control servers and more than 300 related promotional domains, suggesting the threat actors planned further expansion.

A sophisticated malware campaign, codenamed GPUGate, targets IT and software development companies in Western Europe, with recent expansions to macOS users. The campaign leverages Google Ads, SEO poisoning, and fake GitHub commits to deliver malware, including the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) and Odyssey. The attack began in December 2024 and uses a 128 MB Microsoft Software Installer (MSI) to evade detection. The malware employs GPU-gated decryption and various techniques to avoid analysis and detection. The end goal is information theft and delivery of secondary payloads. The threat actors have native Russian language proficiency and use a cross-platform approach. The campaign has expanded to target macOS users through fake Homebrew, LogMeIn, and TradingView platforms. These platforms impersonate popular tools and use SEO poisoning to distribute the Atomic Stealer malware and Odyssey. The threat actors use multiple GitHub usernames to evade takedowns and deploy malware via Terminal commands. Similar tactics have been observed in previous campaigns using malicious Google Ads and public GitHub repositories. The AMOS malware now includes a backdoor component for persistent, stealthy access to compromised systems. The campaign impersonates over 100 software solutions, including 1Password, Dropbox, Confluence, Robinhood, Fidelity, Notion, Gemini, Audacity, Adobe After Effects, Thunderbird, and SentinelOne. The fake GitHub pages were created on September 16, 2025, and were immediately submitted for takedown. The campaign has been active since at least April 2023, with previous similar campaigns observed in July 2025. A new AMOS infostealer campaign abuses Google search ads to lure users into Grok and ChatGPT conversations that lead to installing the AMOS malware on macOS. The campaign was first spotted by researchers at Kaspersky, with a more detailed report by Huntress. The ClickFix attack begins with victims searching for macOS-related terms, leading to malicious instructions in AI chats. The malicious instructions are hosted on legitimate LLM platforms and contain commands to install the malware. The base64-encoded URL decodes into a bash script that loads a fake password prompt dialog. The script validates, stores, and uses the provided password to execute privileged commands, including downloading and executing the AMOS infostealer. AMOS was first documented in April 2023 and is a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) operation targeting macOS systems exclusively. AMOS added a backdoor module earlier this year, allowing operators to execute commands, log keystrokes, and drop additional payloads. AMOS is dropped as a hidden file and scans for cryptocurrency wallets, browser data, macOS Keychain data, and files on the filesystem. Persistence is achieved via a LaunchDaemon running a hidden AppleScript that restarts the malware if terminated. Users are advised to be vigilant and avoid executing commands they found online, especially if they don't fully understand what they do. Kaspersky noted that asking ChatGPT if the provided instructions are safe reveals they are not.

The ClickFix malware campaign has evolved to include multi-OS support and video tutorials that guide victims through the self-infection process. The campaign, which uses fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA pages and malicious PowerShell scripts, has been observed deploying various payloads, including information stealers and backdoors. The FileFix attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, impersonates Meta account suspension warnings to trick users into installing the StealC infostealer malware. The campaign has evolved over two weeks with different payloads, domains, and lures, indicating an attacker testing and adapting their infrastructure. The FileFix technique, created by red team researcher mr. d0x, uses the address bar in File Explorer to execute malicious commands. The campaign employs steganography to hide a second-stage PowerShell script and encrypted executables inside a JPG image, which is believed to be AI-generated. The StealC malware targets credentials from various applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and cloud services, and can take screenshots of the active desktop. The FileFix attack uses a multilingual phishing site to trick users into executing a malicious command via the File Explorer address bar. The attack leverages Bitbucket to host the malicious components, abusing a legitimate source code hosting platform to bypass detection. The attack involves a multi-stage PowerShell script that downloads an image, decodes it into the next-stage payload, and runs a Go-based loader to launch StealC. The attack uses advanced obfuscation techniques, including junk code and fragmentation, to hinder analysis efforts. The FileFix attack is more likely to be detected by security products due to the payload being executed by the web browser used by the victim. The FileFix attack demonstrates significant investment in tradecraft, with carefully engineered phishing infrastructure, payload delivery, and supporting elements to maximize evasion and impact. The MetaStealer attack, a variant of the ClickFix family, uses a fake Cloudflare Turnstile lure and an MSI package disguised as a PDF to deploy the MetaStealer infostealer malware. The attack involves a multi-stage infection chain that includes a DLL sideloading technique using a legitimate SentinelOne executable. The MetaStealer attack targets crypto wallets and other sensitive information, using a combination of social engineering and technical evasion techniques to deploy malware. Recently, threat actors have been abusing the decades-old Finger protocol to retrieve and execute remote commands on Windows devices. The Finger protocol is used to deliver commands that create a random-named path, download a zip archive disguised as a PDF, and extract a Python malware package. The Python program is executed using pythonw.exe __init__.py, and a callback is made to the attacker's server to confirm execution. A related batch file indicates that the Python package is an infostealer. Another campaign uses the Finger protocol to retrieve and run commands that look for malware research tools and exit if found. If no malware analysis tools are found, the commands download a zip archive disguised as PDF files and extract the NetSupport Manager RAT package. The commands configure a scheduled task to launch the remote access malware when the user logs in. The Finger protocol abuse appears to be carried out by a single threat actor conducting ClickFix attacks. A new EVALUSION ClickFix campaign has been discovered, delivering Amatera Stealer and NetSupport RAT. Amatera Stealer, an evolution of ACR Stealer, is available under a malware-as-a-service (MaaS) model and targets crypto-wallets, browsers, messaging applications, FTP clients, and email services. It employs advanced evasion techniques such as WoW64 SysCalls and is packed using PureCrypter. The stealer is injected into the MSBuild.exe process to harvest sensitive data and contact an external server to execute a PowerShell command to fetch and run NetSupport RAT. The campaign also involves phishing attacks using various malware families and phishing kits named Cephas and Tycoon 2FA. Tycoon 2FA is a phishing kit that bypasses multi-factor authentication (MFA) and authentication apps by intercepting usernames, passwords, session cookies, and MFA flows in real-time. It has been used in over 64,000 attacks this year, primarily targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Tycoon 2FA includes anti-detection layers and can lead to total session takeover, allowing attackers to move laterally into various enterprise systems. Legacy MFA methods are vulnerable to Tycoon 2FA, and phishing-proof MFA solutions like Token Ring and Token BioStick are recommended to prevent such attacks. A new operation embedding StealC V2 inside Blender project files has been observed targeting victims for at least six months. The attackers placed manipulated .blend files on platforms such as CGTrader, where users downloaded them as routine 3D assets. When opened with Blender’s Auto Run feature enabled, the files executed concealed Python scripts that launched a multistage infection. The infection chain began with a tampered Rig_Ui.py script embedded inside the .blend file. This script fetched a loader from a remote workers.dev domain, which then downloaded a PowerShell stage and two ZIP archives containing Python-based stealers. Once extracted into the Windows temp directory, the malware created LNK files to secure persistence, then used Pyramid C2 channels to retrieve encrypted payloads. StealC V2, promoted on underground forums since April 2025, has rapidly expanded its feature set. It now targets more than 23 browsers, over 100 plugins, more than 15 desktop wallets, and a range of messaging, VPN and mail clients. Its pricing, from $200 per month to $800 for 6 months, has made it accessible to low-tier cybercriminals seeking ready-to-use tools. ClickFix attack variants have been observed using a realistic-looking Windows Update animation in a full-screen browser page to trick users into executing malicious commands. The new ClickFix variants drop the LummaC2 and Rhadamanthys information stealers. The attack uses steganography to encode the final malware payload inside an image. The process involves multiple stages that use PowerShell code and a .NET assembly (the Stego Loader) responsible for reconstructing the final payload embedded inside a PNG file in an encrypted state. The shellcode holding the infostealer samples is packed using the Donut tool. The Rhadamanthys variant that used the Windows Update lure was first spotted by researchers back in October, before Operation Endgame took down parts of its infrastructure on November 13. A new campaign codenamed JackFix leverages fake adult websites (xHamster, PornHub clones) as its phishing mechanism, likely distributed via malvertising. The JackFix campaign displays highly convincing fake Windows update screens in an attempt to get the victim to run malicious code. The attack heavily leans on obfuscation to conceal ClickFix-related code and blocks users from escaping the full-screen alert by disabling the Escape and F11 buttons, along with F5 and F12 keys. The initial command executed is an MSHTA payload that's launched using the legitimate mshta.exe binary, which contains JavaScript designed to run a PowerShell command to retrieve another PowerShell script from a remote server. The PowerShell script attempts to elevate privileges and creates Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions for command-and-control (C2) addresses and paths where the payloads are staged. The PowerShell script serves up to eight different payloads, including Rhadamanthys Stealer, Vidar Stealer 2.0, RedLine Stealer, Amadey, and other unspecified loaders and RATs. The threat actor often changes the URI used to host the first mshta.exe stage and has been observed moving from hosting the second stage on the domain securitysettings.live to xoiiasdpsdoasdpojas.com, although both point to the same IP address 141.98.80.175. An initial access broker tracked as Storm-0249 is abusing endpoint detection and response solutions and trusted Microsoft Windows utilities to load malware, establish communication, and persistence in preparation for ransomware attacks. The threat actor has moved beyond mass phishing and adopted stealthier, more advanced methods that prove effective and difficult for defenders to counter. In one attack analyzed by researchers at cybersecurity company ReliaQuest, Storm-0249 leveraged the SentinelOne EDR components to hide malicious activity. The attack started with ClickFix social engineering that tricked users into pasting and executing curl commands in the Windows Run dialog to download a malicious MSI package with SYSTEM privileges. A malicious PowerShell script is also fetched from a spoofed Microsoft domain, which is piped straight onto the system's memory, never touching the disk and thus evading antivirus detection. The MSI file drops a malicious DLL (SentinelAgentCore.dll), which is placed strategically alongside the pre-existing, legitimate SentinelAgentWorker.exe, which is already installed as part of the victim's SentinelOne EDR. Next, the attacker loads the DLL using the signed SentinelAgentWorker (DLL sideloading), executing the file within the trusted, privileged EDR process and obtaining stealthy persistence that survives operating system updates. Once the attacker gains access, they use the SentinelOne component to collect system identifiers through legitimate Windows utilities like reg.exe and findstr.exe, and to funnel encrypted HTTPS command-and-control (C2) traffic. The compromised systems are profiled using 'MachineGuid,' a unique hardware-based identifier that ransomware groups like LockBit and ALPHV use for binding encryption keys to specific victims. The abuse of trusted, signed EDR processes bypasses nearly all traditional monitoring. The researchers recommend that system administrators rely on behavior-based detection that identifies trusted processes loading unsigned DLLs from non-standard paths. Furthermore, it is helpful to set stricter controls for curl, PowerShell, and LoLBin execution. A new variation of the ClickFix attack dubbed 'ConsentFix' abuses the Azure CLI OAuth app to hijack Microsoft accounts without the need for a password or to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) verifications. ConsentFix tricks victims into completing the Azure CLI OAuth flow and steals the resulting authorization code, which is exchanged for full account access. The attack starts with victims landing on a compromised, legitimate website that ranks high on Google Search results. Victims are shown a fake Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA widget that asks for a valid business email address, filtering out bots and non-targets. Victims are instructed to click a 'Sign in' button that opens a legitimate Microsoft URL in a new tab, leading to an Azure login page. The attack completes when victims paste the URL containing the Azure CLI OAuth authorization code into the malicious page, granting attackers access to the Microsoft account via Azure CLI. The attack triggers only once per victim IP address, preventing repeated phishing attempts on the same IP. Defenders are advised to monitor for unusual Azure CLI login activity, such as logins from new IP addresses, and to check for legacy Graph scopes used by attackers to evade detection.