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Multi-Stage AitM Phishing and BEC Campaigns Target Energy Sector

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Last updated
2 unique sources, 3 articles

Summary

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Microsoft has identified a multi-stage adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing and business email compromise (BEC) campaign targeting organizations in the energy sector. The attackers abused SharePoint file-sharing services to deliver phishing payloads and created inbox rules to maintain persistence and evade detection. The campaign involved leveraging compromised internal identities to conduct large-scale phishing attacks within and outside the victim organizations. Additionally, the AgreeTo Outlook add-in was hijacked and turned into a phishing kit, stealing over 4,000 Microsoft account credentials. The threat actor deployed a fake Microsoft sign-in page, password collection page, exfiltration script, and redirect, exploiting the add-in's ReadWriteItem permissions. This is the first known instance of malware found on the official Microsoft Marketplace. The add-in was abandoned by its developer and the attacker exploited the abandoned domain to serve the phishing kit. The incident highlights the need for better monitoring of add-ins and their associated URLs.

Timeline

  1. 11.02.2026 23:53 2 articles · 4h ago

    AgreeTo Outlook Add-in Hijacked to Steal 4,000 Credentials

    The AgreeTo Outlook add-in was hijacked and turned into a phishing kit, stealing over 4,000 Microsoft account credentials. The threat actor deployed a fake Microsoft sign-in page, password collection page, exfiltration script, and redirect, exploiting the add-in's ReadWriteItem permissions. This incident marks the first known instance of malware found on the official Microsoft Marketplace. The add-in was abandoned by its developer, and the attacker exploited the abandoned domain to serve the phishing kit. The phishing kit exfiltrated stolen credentials via the Telegram Bot API.

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  2. 11.02.2026 19:45 1 articles · 8h ago

    Koi Security Recommends Measures to Improve Add-in Security

    Koi Security recommends that Microsoft implement mechanisms to re-review add-ins when their URL content changes, verify domain ownership, and delist inactive add-ins. The recommendations aim to address the security gaps highlighted by the AgreeTo add-in hijack and prevent similar incidents in the future.

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  3. 23.01.2026 10:25 2 articles · 19d ago

    Multi-Stage AitM and BEC Campaign Targets Energy Sector

    Microsoft identified a multi-stage AitM and BEC campaign targeting organizations in the energy sector. The attackers abused SharePoint file-sharing services and created inbox rules to maintain persistence. The campaign involved leveraging compromised internal identities to conduct large-scale phishing attacks within and outside the victim organizations. The attack began with phishing emails sent from compromised trusted organizations, redirecting users to fake credential prompts. The compromised inboxes were then used to send further phishing messages, expanding the campaign's scope. Microsoft noted the operational complexity of AitM and the need for organizations to revoke session cookies and remove inbox rules for remediation.

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Information Snippets

Similar Happenings

Misconfigured Email Routing Exploited for Internal Domain Phishing

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OAuth Device Code Phishing Campaigns Target Microsoft 365 Accounts

A surge in phishing campaigns exploiting Microsoft’s OAuth device code authorization flow has been observed, targeting Microsoft 365 accounts. Both state-aligned and financially motivated actors are using social engineering to trick users into approving malicious applications, leading to account takeover and data theft. The attacks leverage the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant, a legitimate process designed for devices with limited input capabilities. Once victims enter a device code generated by an attacker-controlled application, the threat actor receives a valid access token, granting control over the compromised account. The campaigns use QR codes, embedded buttons, and hyperlinked text to initiate the attack chain, often claiming to involve document sharing, token reauthorization, or security verification. The growth of these campaigns is linked to readily available phishing tools like SquarePhish2 and Graphish, which simplify device code abuse and require limited technical skill. Proofpoint observed financially motivated actor TA2723 and Russia-linked group UNK_AcademicFlare adopting this technique, targeting various sectors in the US and Europe. Organizations are advised to strengthen OAuth controls and train users to avoid entering device codes from untrusted sources. The activity, ongoing since September 2025, is being tracked by Proofpoint under the moniker UNK_AcademicFlare. The attacks involve using compromised email addresses belonging to government and military organizations to strike entities within government, think tanks, higher education, and transportation sectors in the U.S. and Europe. The adversary claims to share a link to a document that includes questions or topics for the email recipient to review before the meeting. The URL points to a Cloudflare Worker URL that mimics the compromised sender's Microsoft OneDrive account and instructs the victim to copy the provided code and click 'Next' to access the supposed document. Device code phishing was documented in detail by both Microsoft and Volexity in February 2025, attributing the use of the attack method to Russia-aligned clusters such as Storm-2372, APT29, UTA0304, and UTA0307. The October 2025 campaign is assessed to have been fueled by the ready availability of crimeware offerings like the Graphish phishing kit and red-team tools such as SquarePhish. To counter the risk posed by device code phishing, the best option is to create a Conditional Access policy using the Authentication Flows condition to block device code flow for all users. If that's not feasible, it's advised to use a policy that uses an allow-list approach to allow device code authentication for approved users, operating systems, or IP ranges.

ShadyPanda Browser Extensions Campaign Exploits 4.3M Installs

The ShadyPanda campaign has amassed over 4.3 million installations of malicious Chrome and Edge browser extensions, evolving from legitimate tools into spyware over multiple phases. The extensions, discovered by Koi Security, engaged in affiliate fraud, search hijacking, and remote code execution. The campaign remains active on the Microsoft Edge Add-ons platform, with one extension having 3 million installs. The extensions collect browsing history, search queries, keystrokes, mouse clicks, and other sensitive data, exfiltrating it to domains in China. Users are advised to remove these extensions and reset their account passwords. The ShadyPanda campaign used a supply-chain attack tactic by publishing or acquiring harmless extensions, letting them run clean for years to build trust and gain millions of installs, then suddenly flipping them into malware via silent updates. The compromised extensions became a fully fledged remote code execution (RCE) framework inside the browser, capable of downloading and running arbitrary JavaScript with full access to the browser's data and capabilities. The extensions could steal session cookies and tokens, allowing them to impersonate entire SaaS accounts such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace. The risk of malicious browser extensions extends beyond individual users, as they can access cookies, local storage, cloud auth sessions, active web content, and file downloads, blurring the line between endpoint security and cloud security. Organizations should enforce extension allow lists, treat extension access like OAuth access, audit extension permissions regularly, and monitor for suspicious extension behavior to reduce the risk of malicious extensions. Modern SaaS security platforms, such as Reco's Dynamic SaaS Security platform, can help organizations monitor and detect suspicious activity related to browser extensions in real time.

Chinese State-Sponsored Group Exploits Windows Zero-Day in Espionage Campaign Against European Diplomats

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New CoPhish technique exploits Microsoft Copilot for OAuth phishing

A new phishing technique called 'CoPhish' leverages Microsoft Copilot Studio agents to deliver fraudulent OAuth consent requests. The technique exploits the legitimate and trusted Microsoft domains to trick users into granting permissions to malicious applications. The CoPhish technique was developed by researchers at Datadog Security Labs, who highlighted the risks associated with the flexibility of Copilot Studio. Microsoft has acknowledged the issue and plans to address it in a future update. The attack targets users, including administrators, by embedding malicious applications within Copilot Studio agents. Once activated, these agents can be distributed via email or messaging platforms, making it difficult for users to distinguish between legitimate and malicious requests. Users can protect against CoPhish attacks by limiting administrative privileges, reducing application permissions, enforcing governance policies, implementing a strong application consent policy, disabling user application creation defaults, and closely monitoring application consent via Entra ID and Copilot Studio agent creation events.