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China-Linked APTs Deploy PeckBirdy JScript C2 Framework Since 2023

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3 unique sources, 3 articles

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China-aligned APT actors have been using the PeckBirdy JScript-based command-and-control (C2) framework since 2023 to target Chinese gambling industries, Asian government entities, and private organizations. The framework leverages living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) for execution across various environments. Two campaigns, SHADOW-VOID-044 and SHADOW-EARTH-045, have been identified, each employing different tactics, including credential harvesting and malware delivery. The framework's flexibility allows it to operate across web browsers, MSHTA, WScript, Classic ASP, Node JS, and .NET, using multiple communication methods like WebSocket and Adobe Flash ActiveX objects. Additional scripts for exploitation, social engineering, and backdoor delivery have been observed, along with links to known backdoors like HOLODONUT and MKDOOR. HOLODONUT disables security features such as AMSI before executing payloads in memory, while MKDOOR disguises its network traffic as legitimate Microsoft support or activation pages and attempts to evade Microsoft Defender by altering exclusion settings. Infrastructure overlaps and shared tooling suggest SHADOW-VOID-044 is linked with UNC3569, a China-aligned group previously associated with the GRAYRABBIT backdoor. Some samples used stolen code-signing certificates to legitimize malicious Cobalt Strike payloads, and SHADOW-EARTH-045 showed weaker but notable ties to activity previously attributed to Earth Baxia. The Shadow-Void-044 campaign used stolen code-signing certificates, Cobalt Strike payloads, and exploits, including CVE-2020-16040, to maintain persistent access. The Shadow-Earth-045 campaign targeted a Philippine educational institution in July 2024, using the GrayRabbit backdoor and the HoloDonut backdoor. The threat actor behind the Shadow-Earth campaign developed a .NET executable to launch PeckBirdy with ScriptControl.

Timeline

  1. 27.01.2026 11:01 3 articles · 2d ago

    PeckBirdy Framework Used in Targeted Attacks Since 2023

    China-aligned APT actors have been using the PeckBirdy JScript-based C2 framework since 2023 to target Chinese gambling industries, Asian government entities, and private organizations. The framework leverages LOLBins for execution across various environments. Two campaigns, SHADOW-VOID-044 and SHADOW-EARTH-045, have been identified, each employing different tactics, including credential harvesting and malware delivery. The framework's flexibility allows it to operate across web browsers, MSHTA, WScript, Classic ASP, Node JS, and .NET, using multiple communication methods like WebSocket and Adobe Flash ActiveX objects. Additional scripts for exploitation, social engineering, and backdoor delivery have been observed, along with links to known backdoors like HOLODONUT and MKDOOR. HOLODONUT disables security features such as AMSI before executing payloads in memory, while MKDOOR disguises its network traffic as legitimate Microsoft support or activation pages and attempts to evade Microsoft Defender by altering exclusion settings. Infrastructure overlaps and shared tooling suggest SHADOW-VOID-044 is linked with UNC3569, a China-aligned group previously associated with the GRAYRABBIT backdoor. Some samples used stolen code-signing certificates to legitimize malicious Cobalt Strike payloads, and SHADOW-EARTH-045 showed weaker but notable ties to activity previously attributed to Earth Baxia. The Shadow-Void-044 campaign used stolen code-signing certificates, Cobalt Strike payloads, and exploits, including CVE-2020-16040, to maintain persistent access. The Shadow-Earth-045 campaign targeted a Philippine educational institution in July 2024, using the GrayRabbit backdoor and the HoloDonut backdoor. The threat actor behind the Shadow-Earth campaign developed a .NET executable to launch PeckBirdy with ScriptControl.

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