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Starkiller Phishing Kit Bypasses MFA via Proxy-Based Attacks

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2 unique sources, 2 articles

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A new phishing kit called Starkiller has emerged, allowing attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by proxying legitimate login pages. The kit is distributed as a subscription-based service on the dark web, offering real-time session monitoring and keylogging capabilities. It mimics login pages of major services like Google, Microsoft, and banks, routing traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure to steal credentials and authentication tokens. Starkiller uses Docker containers running headless Chrome instances to serve genuine page content, making it difficult for security vendors to detect or block. The toolkit is sold with updates and customer support, posing a significant escalation in phishing infrastructure. The service is part of a broader cybercrime offering by a threat group called Jinkusu, which provides additional features such as email harvesting and campaign analytics.

Timeline

  1. 19.02.2026 14:00 2 articles · 2d ago

    Starkiller Phishing Kit Bypasses MFA via Proxy-Based Attacks

    A new phishing kit called Starkiller has emerged, allowing attackers to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) by proxying legitimate login pages. The kit is distributed as a subscription-based service on the dark web, offering real-time session monitoring and keylogging capabilities. It mimics login pages of major services like Google, Microsoft, and banks, routing traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure to steal credentials and authentication tokens. Starkiller uses Docker containers running headless Chrome instances to serve genuine page content, making it difficult for security vendors to detect or block. The toolkit is sold with updates and customer support, posing a significant escalation in phishing infrastructure. The service is part of a broader cybercrime offering by a threat group called Jinkusu, which provides additional features such as email harvesting and campaign analytics.

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