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APT28 DNS hijacking campaigns via compromised SOHO routers observed in 2025–2026 targeting credential theft

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2 unique sources, 2 articles

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APT28 (Fancy Bear/Forest Blizzard), attributed to Russia’s GRU unit GTsSS Military Unit 26165, has conducted opportunistic DNS hijacking campaigns since at least August 2025 by compromising small office/home office (SOHO) routers—primarily TP-Link models such as WR841N—to redirect victim traffic through attacker-controlled DNS servers and steal credentials. The campaign peaked in December 2025, compromising over 18,000 networks, including 200 organizations and 5,000 consumer devices, and specifically targeted government agencies such as ministries of foreign affairs, law enforcement, and third-party email providers. TP-Link routers were likely exploited via CVE-2023-50224 to retrieve credentials, which were then used in adversary-in-the-middle attacks against browser sessions and desktop applications to harvest credentials for web and email services. APT28 operates a persistent infrastructure of VPSs repurposed as malicious DNS servers, receiving DNS requests from exploited routers and enabling opportunistic triage to identify high-value targets. Microsoft reported this is the first time APT28 has used DNS hijacking at scale to support post-compromise adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks on TLS connections against Microsoft Outlook on the web domains, intercepting OAuth authentication tokens after successful MFA authentication without requiring additional malware on compromised routers.

Timeline

  1. 07.04.2026 18:30 2 articles · 8h ago

    APT28 DNS hijacking campaigns via compromised SOHO routers observed since August 2025 with credential theft focus

    APT28 (GRU GTsSS Military Unit 26165) compromised small office/home office routers—primarily TP-Link WR841N—since at least August 2025 by modifying DHCP DNS settings to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled DNS servers. TP-Link routers were likely exploited via CVE-2023-50224 to retrieve credentials, which were then used in adversary-in-the-middle attacks against browser sessions and desktop applications to harvest credentials for web and email services. APT28 operates a persistent infrastructure of VPSs repurposed as malicious DNS servers, receiving DNS requests from exploited routers and enabling opportunistic triage to identify high-value targets. New details from this article: The campaign peaked in December 2025, compromising over 18,000 networks including 200 organizations and 5,000 consumer devices, primarily using older MikroTik and TP-Link SOHO routers. The group targeted government agencies such as ministries of foreign affairs, law enforcement, and third-party email providers. APT28 exploited unsupported or outdated routers without installing malware, instead using known vulnerabilities to modify DNS settings and intercept OAuth authentication tokens from Microsoft Office users after successful MFA authentication. Microsoft reported this is the first time APT28 has used DNS hijacking at scale to support adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks on TLS connections against Microsoft Outlook on the web domains.

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