TEE.Fail DDR5 side-channel analysis against Intel SGX, Intel TDX, and AMD SEV-SNP
Technical Analysis
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TEE.Fail demonstrates that a DDR5 memory-bus interposition attack can break trusted execution environments, undermining the confidentiality promises of Intel SGX, Intel TDX, and AMD SEV-SNP. The research matters because it shows secret extraction and attestation forgery are feasible with physical access and low-cost hardware. The technique expands prior DDR4 ciphertext attacks and weakens assumptions behind confidential computing on modern servers.
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28.10.2025 19:00 1 articles · 7mo ago
TEE.Fail DDR5 side-channel analysis disclosure
Technical Analysis UpdateResearchers from Georgia Tech and Purdue University described TEE.Fail, a DDR5 memory-bus interposition attack against Intel SGX, Intel TDX, and AMD SEV-SNP that can extract secrets, forge attestations, and impersonate TEEs. The work says the attack can be performed with physical access and low-cost hardware, uses a logic analyzer with a RDIMM riser and a custom probe isolation network, and can recover signing material from enclave and VM-protected workloads; the researchers also said the findings were reported to Intel, AMD, and NVIDIA in April, June, and August 2025.
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- TEE.Fail attack breaks confidential computing on Intel, AMD, NVIDIA CPUs — www.bleepingcomputer.com — 28.10.2025 19:00