TEE.Fail DDR5 side-channel analysis of Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP memory interposition
Technical Analysis
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TEE.Fail is a newly demonstrated DDR5 side-channel that can extract secrets from Intel SGX/TDX and AMD SEV-SNP, weakening trust in confidential-computing attestation on current server hardware.
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Timeline
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28.10.2025 21:16 1 articles · 7mo ago
Researchers disclose TEE.Fail DDR5 side-channel attack
Initial DisclosureResearchers from Georgia Tech, Purdue University, and Synkhronix disclosed TEE.Fail, a side-channel attack against DDR5 systems that uses an off-the-shelf interposition device to inspect memory traffic and extract secrets from Intel SGX/TDX and AMD SEV-SNP with Ciphertext Hiding. The study says AES-XTS is deterministic and insufficient against physical memory interposition, that the technique can recover cryptographic keys and some attestation keys from fully updated machines, and that extracted attestation keys may also compromise Nvidia's GPU Confidential Computing and OpenSSL's ECDSA implementation.
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- New TEE.Fail Side-Channel Attack Extracts Secrets from Intel and AMD DDR5 Secure Enclaves — thehackernews.com — 28.10.2025 21:16