CyberHappenings logo
☰
Home Browse Watchlists Experimental About

Track cybersecurity events as they unfold. Sourced timelines. Filter, sort, and browse. Fast, privacy‑respecting. No invasive ads, no tracking.

Supply chain subversion via trojanized browser extensions and npm packages enables silent runtime data interception

First reported
Last updated
1 unique sources, 1 articles

Summary

Hide ▲

Between December 2024 and December 2025, threat actors evolved typosquatting into a supply chain attack vector by compromising developer credentials and injecting malicious code into widely used browser extensions and npm packages. Attackers exploited inherited trust in dependency chains by pushing trojanized versions of legitimate packages or extensions through official distribution channels, including the Chrome Web Store. Malicious payloads executed silently at runtime within users' browsers, intercepting sensitive data such as seed phrases, payment card information, and private keys before the legitimate application processed them. No server breaches or user misdirection were required; the compromise originated from within trusted software supply chains. Detection was evaded because existing security controls—firewalls, WAFs, EDR, and CSP—lack visibility into post-execution runtime behavior within the browser. The Trust Wallet Chrome extension incident in December 2025 resulted in $8.5 million stolen from 2,500 wallets within 48 hours. Similar attacks targeted npm packages like chalk/debug and @solana/web3.js, demonstrating scalability and cross-platform impact beyond cryptocurrency ecosystems.

Timeline

  1. 20.05.2026 13:30 1 articles · 8h ago

    Developer credential harvesting enables trojanized Trust Wallet extension deployment through Chrome Web Store

    Between September and December 2025, attackers systematically harvested developer credentials—including GitHub tokens, npm publishing keys, and Chrome Web Store API credentials—likely via phishing and social engineering campaigns. Using the compromised credentials, attackers pushed a trojanized version of the Trust Wallet Chrome extension through the official Chrome Web Store, bypassing verification controls. The malicious extension executed entirely within users' browsers, capturing seed phrases and transmitting them to attacker-controlled domains masquerading as Trust Wallet analytics endpoints. No server-side breach occurred; all compromise vectors operated within the trusted supply chain. The attack remained undetected for 48 hours, during which 2,500 wallets were drained for a total loss of $8.5 million.

    Show sources
    Open in new tab

Information Snippets